Introduction There are some quarters out there that are accusing the neoconservatives, who currently occupy the Whitehouse, of helping to engineer the Irish "no" vote though underhanded funding of opposition groups, but this is just speculation. What is crystal-clear is that some other neoconservatives quarters on the Western side of the Atlantic find the Lisbon Treaty a threat to American "interests" in Europe. The threat stems from the possibility that the European Union will acquire the tools to become active on the international stage and quite possibly oppose the United States on some issues. Also repulsive to this ilk is any attempt by Europeans to have a European Security and Defense identity apart from NATO. This concern for "American interests in Europe" stems from realists notions that "European nations would play power politics" if America was evicted from Europe. Actually, more than the Irish, it could very well be that the greatest opposition to the Lisbon Treaty comes from the western side of the Atlantic. This American opposition possibly stems from the desire for the "maintenance of the unipolar moment," the maintenance of American primacy in the world order, and, according to Josef Joffe (2002), America as "unique in time and space." America the Hegemon, can hang on to Number One, by keeping others from "ganging up" and joining forces to balance out America the Hegemon, the Number One (1). Here in lies the mentality that is espoused by various think tanks, most noteworthy the Heritage Foundation, that Europe's ambitions, especially for independent-from-NATO, "permanent structured cooperation" on common defense is a threat to America the Hegemon. To understand how the Lisbon Treaty can be viewed as a threat to American primacy, there must be a look at just what are American "interests" in Europe in the first place. TOP American "interests" in Europe in a nut shell. America's largely selfish "interests" are found chiefly in the desire to maintain NATO as the primary European defense organization. To discover the "ties that bind," look no further than the strains made by Washington to maintain the outdated Atlantic Alliance. Some of this stems from the notion that, if American troops disappeared and NATO went out of business, European nations would go back to the same power politics that lead to centuries of bloody wars. The so-called transatlantic "ties that bind" are viewed, rightly or wrongly, as necessary for American-brand international security. Europe, with its emphasis on the soft power of diplomacy, is viewed by American foreign policy realists as "weak" in international security, incapable of over-coming its past power politics, and largely meaningless in America's "war on terrorism." Europe is a threat to itself for its perceived shortcomings. Europeans prefer American hegemony? European leaders with Europhobia? Part of "America's interests" in Europe, so it is claimed, is to prevent a return to old power politics that dominated the continent in past centuries, especially with regard to Germany. There is the argument that European nations would prefer their hegemonic balance coming from Washington than, say - Berlin. NATO and American troops are required to prevent security cooperation among European nations and European leaders have now accepted American hegemonic "leadership," so they say (2). The notion of that Europeans may be in the mode of accepting American troops providing "regional stability" is advanced by Stephan Walt (2002). In this argument, there is the notion that neighboring nations, including EU Member States, "don't trust each other" and that the US "lies comfortably away and does not threaten its allies physically." (3). A European diplomat was reported to have said that a European power broker "would appear to be acting as a hegemon," but that "we (Europeans) agree on U.S leadership, but not our own" (4).
The preference for the American hegemon in the form of "U.S leadership" might also explain the obsession by some European leaders to "please Washington" and even cooperate in the criminal activities of the CIA renditions. It may be that leaders like these that actually welcome American retrenchment and would fight against any other setting, including in the European Union. Some European leaders enjoy taking orders (sometimes against their own countries' best interests) from Washington, but, gladly, an increasing number of them want no more of it! Most of the rational for European security cooperation centers around a "European resentment" of American military power, and, while some want American retrenchment, others resent it, prompting them to work on developing their own capabilities (5). The notion of "European resentment." Ivo H. Daalder spends much of his chapter for Robert Lieber's Eagle Rules (2001) book reminiscing about the good ol' days of America as protector of Europe from the Soviet Union and providing salvation to persecuted Kosovars. Daalder blames the desire for European independence on concern over European dependence on American power. Another reason for "European resentment" is the dominance of American political and cultural values, and Europeans fear the Americans will impose their death penalty, gun-touting, individualist cultural values on Europe (6). This "resentment" is translating into Europe occasionally attempting to craft its own autonomous capabilities, which prompt quick reaction from Washington. There shall be no supplanting of NATO, no duplication of NATO, and epically, no getting away from NATO. It is fine if Europe acquires military capabilities and carries its "share of the burdens," but any policy proposal that seeks to lessen the role of the Cold War alliance is met with howls from congressional supporters of NATO and Atlanticist policy supporters that the European Union shall not compete with NATO (7). The notion that Europe resents this dominance over especially their security affairs by the American hegemonic power is what is causing European nations to cooperate on their own security, according to Seth Jones (2007). Jones also argues that European security cooperation has to do with a desire for less dependence on the US and - about preserving the peace at home in Europe and projecting power abroad. The likely result of closer security and defense cooperation will be friction with the US if and when closer security cooperation occurs outside of NATO (8), as described in the Lisbon Treaty. TOP The power of European Defense in the Lisbon Treaty. Kenneth Waltz, like Seth Jones, believes that the only thing lacking the European Union, which has "all the tools-population, resources, technology, and military capabilities, but lacks the organizational ability and the collective will to use them" (9). Despite warnings from the Pentagon that it will "be active" in opposing an EU counterpart separate from Supreme Allied Powers Europe, Europe plows ahead anyway with vasious provision in the Lisbon Treaty. So, the Pentagon will work to oppose an EU counterpart though such plans as "dual hatted" the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (always a European) and placing EU-led operations under NATO planning (10). Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty seeks to provide the Union with its own the "permanent structured cooperation" and gives the European Defense Agency more of a legal footing to stand on (11): The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States" Lisbon Treaty - Article 27(a)(1).TOP The Neocons and the Lisbon Treaty. One of those Reaganite-Thatrcherite think tanks that especially despised the Lisbon Treaty and none other that the Heritage Foundation, which the Thatcher Centre for Freedom is also associated. So, it is no big shock that Sally McNamara alleges a threat to the Atlantic Alliance and the US-UK "special relationship." In her January 2008 essay, McNamara's complaints about the Reform Treaty (Lisbon Treaty) especially center on the "special relationship," and that Britain's ability to make its own independent foreign policy will be jeopardized. What is reflected in this policy paper is the fear that the "special relationship" will be harmed if Europe is given the tools to promote its values regardless of Britain's common values that are shared with America (12). To these folks, Gordon Brown is really a traitor for "signing away Britain's sovereignty."
What is interesting is how McNamara starts her February 20 paper and everyone interested in the European project should take notice. She states that "U.S.policy makers thought that American strategic interests" were "safe" in the hands of Nicholas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel after their "successful visits to Washington." The Treaty, McNamara complains, is like the old constitutional treaty that underscores the EU's ambitions to become a global power and challenge American leadership on the world stage. McNamara's other complaint about the Lisbon Treaty is that it is "being the same form as the constitutional treaty that has now been handed down by EU elites" (13). It is clear that McNamara is bothered by the Union testing its ability to take on its own military security missions and wants to defense its own interests, which would include a common position in areas of foreign policy. McNamara is an advocate of the subversion of the Community method and that "America should be concerned" by the a common EU foreign policy position. For her foreign policy "implications," McNamara concentrates on the beloved position of Britain, its "foreign policy independence," and, (surprise, surprise!), NATO primacy over European security and defense identity: Its (the European Union's) strategic interests often contrast with U.S. interests, and with European military and civilian power invested in the CFSP, rather than in NATO, America's interests inevitably lose out. The biggest security threats facing Europe and the U.S. are asymmetric and constantly evolving. Thus far, NATO under American leadership has been working with a handful of its closest allies at the forefront of this struggle, but the U.S. cannot be expected to continue providing this leadership if the transatlantic alliance is downgraded (14). The "struggle," of course, is to squash Europe from taking its rightful place on the world stage and "challenging American global leadership." The American Thinker offers a view that openly expressed the desire to kill the Lisbon Treaty and any aspirations that Europe expresses to take its rightful place in the world. Soeren Kern argues that the Europeans "want to make it politically costly for America to use its military might in the future." However, Kern is very open about what America "should do" about further European integration: Europeans claim they are American allies, but increasingly their conduct says they are rivals. Americans should take another look and see if further European integration is really in the US interest. At the very least, Washington should send an unambiguous message to free-riding Europeans: future attempts at anti-American coalition building will be very costly. International security depends on it (15).TOP From the Schuman Declaration to the Lisbon Treaty.
Europeans, especially their leaders, need to understand that further European global ambitions that are, by the way, consistent with the Schuman Declaration, will draw opposition from the United States, especially neoconservatives. The notion of "defending America's strategic interests" now include squashing Europe's ambitions to take its rightful place on the world stage, even if that means an European activism that opposes "America's interests." The prime strategy to "defend American interests" is to ground European militaries to NATO. At least one Frenchman gets it. Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the France's Europe minister, has the idea just right with regard to the possible role that neoconservatives and their rich supporters, like Declan Ganley played in funding Libertas, the main group of the Irish "no" vote effort (16). Europe has powerful enemies on the other side of the Atlantic, gifted with considerable financial means. The role of American neo-conservatives was very important in the victory of the No (17). The "transatlantic partnership" resembles an abusive marriage where the husband, America, keeps his wife Europe locked in the house and refuses to let her out (actively squashing Europe's global aspirations). This husband America occasionally demands that his wife Europe do criminal acts (CIA renditions) and then she still loves him and does his abusive bidding (supporting Kosovo independence). It is time for Europe to seek a divorce and a restraining order against this abusive relationship (18). The viewpoint by the authors mentioned, including McNamara, is that America is needed in Europe to "protect American interests" in terms of regional stability doesn't take into account the existence of the cooperation in the European Union. The European Union factor is almost never discussed in the American foreign policy realist literature. The exception is Seth Jones, who brought up the "nations pooling resources" argument. There are also the successful EU missions in diverse places like Chad, Lebanon and the Balkans, and these are probably building confidence and trust among the militaries of the Member States. Sarkozy is counting on a shift in that attitude, and if the moment seems ripe for one, it's partly because circumstances have demonstrated the practicality of an independent EU defense capacity. As Miraillet pointed out, military interventions come wrapped in political context. In both Lebanon and Chad, the EU was able to deploy in places that NATO can't, whether due to its perceived American affiliation or lack of experience in the theater of operations. Those deployments, meanwhile, have demonstrated to France's European partners the need for planning and command capacity. 'We're really calm about ESDP, because we're pragmatic,' said Miraillet. "For the first time, we're not the dogmatic ones. It's the operational need that's decisive (19). The need for American realists to "protect Europeans from themselves" appears to be a throw-back to the old French fears about rearming Germany, now rehashed into an excuse to keep the American flag planted in Europe. Europe, especially Nicholas Sarkozy, and his European Presidency (second half of 2008) need to work for an independent European defense, including a permanent cooperative structure. There are some good indications coming out of Paris with regard to proposals, such as a going ahead with a permanent structured cooperation regardless of the outcome of the Lisbon Treaty. We must count on France to take up its long dreamed of position to lead Europe, side-by-side with Germany, in furthering the European project and avoid eurosclerosis, especially in a defense and security identity. It is about the spirit of the Schuman Declaration, now extended to Franco-German European defense and security. So let's recall:
Europe and the world demand no less - ratify the Lisbon Treaty! Endnotes 1. Josef Joffe. "Defying History and Theory: The United States as the Last Remaining Superpower," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. G. John Ikenberry, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002). 155-180. 2. Stephen M. Walt. "Keeping the World Off-Balance," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. G. John Ikenberry, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002), 122-154. 3. Structural Realism, according to Michael Doyle (1998), has as its chief author Thomas Hobbs who proposed that self motivated humans would form states due to the chaotic world order. The states then would maintain a "state of war" among other states and don't trust them. States should also be treated a unitary, rational actors. The international system is chaotic and in a "state of war" (113). This thought is part of rational actor model of today. The adherents of Structural Realism in America, as we can then see, regard the world as in a "state of war" and Europe, with its past history, is regarded by "American interests" as having "a potiental for war" 4. Walt, 133. 5. Ivo Daalder. The United States and Europe: From Primacy to Partnership? in Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty -First Century. Robert J. Lieber, ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 70-96. 6. Joffe, 165; Daalder, 81. 7. Daalder, 82. 8. Seth Jones. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 9. Kenneth N. Waltz. "Structural Realism after the Cold War" in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. G. John Ikenberry, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002) 29-67. 10. Jones, 85. United States Department of Defense. Responsibility Sharing Report. (June, 2002). US Dept. of Defense, Chapter II. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2001/Allied2001-Chap2.html [accessed June 26, 2008]. 11. Ralf Grahn. "EU Treaty of Lisbon: European Defence Agency." Grahnlaw (January 31, 2008), under http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/2008/01/eu-treaty-of-lisbon-european-defence.html. [accessed on June 26, 2008]. 12. Sally McNamara. The EU Reform Treaty: Why Washington Should Be Concerned. The Heritage Foundation. (January 10, 2008), under http://www.heritage.org [accessed on June 24, 2008]. 13. Sally McNamara. "The EU Reform Treaty: A Threat to the Transatlantic Alliance." The Heritage Foundation. (February 20, 2008), under http://www.heritage.org [accessed June 24, 2008]. McNamara make a call for, especially Britain, but other people in other EU Member States, to demand referendums. Are we not hearing this same call? Does this call also include pushing off the misleading definition of "democracy" as only referendums? 14. Ibid. 15. Soeren Kern. "America Wake Up! Europe Wants to Be a Superpower." (October 24, 2007). The American Thinker. http://www.americanthinker.com under [accessed on June 24, 2008]. 16. There is the fishy smell from the Irish "no" vote effort as it has all the hallmarks of a covert CIA political operation as described in John Jacob Nutter's 2000 book The CIA's Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy and Democracy. (New York: Prometheus Books). Dr. Nutter is a U. of Michigan professor and former employee of the Agency. 17. EUobserver. "Europe has 'powerful enemies' in US, says French Europe minister." (June 24, 2008), under http://euobserver.com/9/26386 . [accessed June 24, 2008]. 18. One should read the CV's of those that want to continue the transatlantic abusive relationship and check their "Atlanticist" connections. Especially check the CV's of those who are calling the Lisbon Treaty dead. 19. Judah Grunstein. "France's Strategic Posture: NATO Reintegration and European Defense." World Politics Review. (June 10, 2008). World Politics Review, under http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=2257 [accessed on June 26, 2008]. 20. Robert Schuman. "The Schuman Declaration," in The European Union: Readings of the Theory and Practice European Integration. Brent, Nelsen F., and Alexander C-G. Stubb. eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 13-14. TOP Selected Bibliography - Recommended Reading. Nelsen F Brent, and Alexander C-G. Stubb. eds. 1998. The European Union: Readings of the Theory and Practice European Integration. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). Michael Doyle. Ways of War and Peace. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1997). G. John Ikenberry, ed. America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002) Seth Jones. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Robert J. Lieber, ed. Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty -First Century. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001) United States Department of Defense. Responsibility Sharing Report. (June 2002). Washington D.C.: US Dept. of Defense, Chapter II. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2001/Allied2001-Chap2.html. |
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