Building of Homeland Security and
Intelligence against Terrorism.
ESLaPorte @ Yellow
Stars
3 March 2007
Introduction. The American efforts at homeland security
have been forced to undergo drastic changes since September 11th, 2001 attacks
by the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The main transformation has been in
America's intelligence community (IC), how intelligence is coordinated, used
and especially shared, to meet the new need of preventing terrorist attacks on
America's homeland. This paper uses the Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw
framework (2000), which is focused on four main elements of successful
counterterrorism policies and plans: legitimacy, collaboration, intelligence
service coordination and a command and control structure. To defeat, deny,
diminish and defend from the threat of terrorist attacks on the American
Homeland, the United States is implementing an effective counterterrorism
strategy based chiefly on intelligence community coordination and intelligence
sharing. The good and most effective use of intelligence by America's
intelligence community is key to winning the war against terrorism.
Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to use the Hoffman
and Morrison-Taw framework to study national strategy documents and policy
papers to study homeland security. The extensive study of post-September 11th
activities to combat terrorism against the American Homeland from outside of
the United States is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper looks at
primarily counterterrorism in the American Homeland and building of
institutions viewed through the lens of the Hoffman and Morrison-Taw framework.
In doing so, this paper uses mainly documents from American government sources
to study the emerging American counterterrorism framework. Recent documents,
although not exhaustive, are used to focus on recent developments.
Theoretical Framework. The Hoffman and Morrison-Taw
framework is a four-element framework for the study of successful
counterterrorism plans in European counterterrorism efforts. The Europeans have
had highly successful efforts, including cross border efforts, to combat
terrorism with little threat to civil liberties and human rights in the context
of European human rights' conventions. The four element study the creation of
command and control structures, along with intelligence service coordination
and collaboration between governments, there is the need for "legitimizing" and
trust building measures for public support. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw have used
their four-element methodology to study terrorism mainly in Europe from "red"
groups during the Cold War.
"Legitimizing" measures are steps needed by the government to
build public support and obtain legislation that takes into account public
sensibilities. Undermining perceived legitimacy for terrorist actions can
include such measures as making political concessions to religious minorities,
address housing and employment concerns and redress grievances that may be
exploited by terrorist groups. These help governments deprive terrorists the
claim that they are the solution to the improvement for the population (Hoffman
and Morrison-Taw 2000).
Hoffman and Morrison-Taw suggest that consistent policies are
more effective than ad hoc, patchwork plans. Italy relied on mainly on
legislative measures and gave fewer efforts to intelligence operations. The
Italian Government's inconsistent policy response to the kidnapping operation
perpetrated by the Red Brigades in the 1970's caused that government to be
thrown into confusion, and the terrorists saw kidnapping as a good strategy.
Sound and effective counterterrorism policy must be preventative and
pre-emptive, argue Hoffman and Morrison-Taw. The trade-off is that there must
be a balance between strong policy and good public relations. This not only
includes effective legislation to combat terrorism, but also includes effective
responses to the balance of civil liberties. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw argue
that public relations must become a serious battleground against terrorists.
Terrorists often seek to influence public policy and government actions, which
make the terrorists' position, look like a better alternative. The government
authorities must take the public relations and the building of public trust as
seriously as any other struggle or war.
A nation facing a terrorist campaign is facing a struggle that
is quite different from "normal" wars and violent conflict. Hoffman and
Morrison-Taw point out experience of France in the mid-1990's was that of a
different violent struggle. In the summer of 1995, terrorists planted nail
bombs around Paris that killed several people and injured 180 people.
Anti-terrorism laws were enacted and thousands of anti-terrorist police and
soldiers were sent into the streets, but the bombings continued. The military
power of the country was of no use once the terrorist campaign had
"metastasized" to the disaffected Algerian youth. The original bombings were
started by "professionals" and then carried on by youthful followers, even
after the "professionals" were arrested.
The building of public trust is the key in a successful
counterterrorism campaign. A populace that the public has a role in
intelligence efforts and gaining public trust is key to effective intelligence
efforts. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw argue that the appropriate use of
intelligence and the establishment of coordination and dissemination of
intelligence is key to the effective channeling of counterterrorism efforts.
The use of effective intelligence and foreign collaboration was demonstrated in
the first Gulf War against Iraq, where intelligence services from Europe, the
Middle East, the United States, Syria and Israel took part in planned
operations and attacks. The authors argue that any successful counterterrorism
campaign will have three tasks: the acquisition, proper analysis, and
coordination and dissemination of intelligence.
Another element of the Hoffman and Morrison-Taw framework is
collaboration, especially foreign cooperation. The authors argue that the
sporadic nature of foreign collaboration is due to the political, economic and
diplomatic interests of nations that affect their abilities to cooperate in
counterterrorism joint efforts. Often the individual differences between
nations and regions can conflict, and, to some extent the personalities and
relationships between leaders, police military and security personnel. While
all campaigns can benefit from increased international cooperation in the form
of aid and extradition agreements, different political cultures among nations
can become problematic.
Homeland Security and Intelligence. The type of threat
faced by the United States' homeland originates from outside the United States,
whereas the cases studied with the Hoffman-Morrison-Taw framework were largely
internal threats. The 9/11 Report documents that Usama bin Laden had been
makings threats against the United States since 1992. Bin Laden uses messages
that appeal to many in the Islamic world that is facing the modern world in the
era of globalization. America is to blame for the decline of Islam and attacks
on Muslims around the globe and America and the West should be resisted, and
even converted to Islam. America and the West are societies are indecent and
corrupt. The message of bin Laden appeals to frustrated young men in
communities and societies that offer little in the way of satisfying their
aspirations. Bin Laden's message that it is the duty of Islamic men to fight
"Jews and Crusaders" is appealing to frustrated young men. These young men are
then lead to kill themselves while killing others in the name of Usama bin
Laden's vision of Islam. The pronouncements of Bin Laden are that there is no
difference between those people in military uniform and those people who are
civilians. The al-Qaeda movement spawned by bin Laden, responsible for the
well-planned and organized September 11th, 2001 attacks, as well as other
attacks - and the threat of future attacks - has caused the United States to
realign homeland security to new post-Cold War paradigms in response (The 9/11
Commission 2004, Masse 2006).
The National Security Strategy of the United States that was
released about a year after the September 11th, 2001 attacks states that "the
distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing" (White House
2002:31). The "command and control structure" for the United States in the area
of homeland counterterrorism is focused on cooperation in especially the IC
between both "traditional" foreign intelligence and law enforcement
intelligence, which traditionally focuses on criminal activity. The policy
advocated for mainly intelligence efforts against terrorist threats to the
American Homeland is one of decentralization. The decentralization of efforts
is chiefly in the area of intelligence in homeland security intelligence
(HSINT) in the bringing together traditional foreign intelligence with law
enforcement criminal intelligence (Masse 2006).
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte has
declared that the bolstering of intelligence in support of homeland security is
"enterprise objective number one" (qtd. in Masse 2006:5). The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created the position of
Director of National Intelligence, and its current occupant sees his office as
having a mandate "to integrate the foreign, military and domestic dimensions of
United States intelligence into an unified enterprise that meets the highest
standards of objectivity, accuracy and timeliness" (U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
July 2006:2). Disunity was viewed as the impetuous behind the creation of
IRTPA. The job, or "tall order" that DNI Negroponte sees for himself and his
colleagues is to "connect the dots and cross the foreign-domestic" divide and
remove policy and technical obstacles to information sharing (U.S. Chamber of
Commerce July 2006, "WMD Report" 31 March 2005).
DNI Negroponte has stated that the building of institutions
remains primarily a federal-centric activity and refinement of the FBI's
National Security Branch, the National Counterterrorism Center and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence Analysis. The
domestic agenda, according to DNI Negroponte, involves providing a
multidirectional flow through out the intelligence community, the U.S.
government, law enforcement and the private sector (Masse 2006, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce July 2006).
The National Strategy for Homeland Security is a policy
document that is about command and control, and shares some aspects of
collaboration. This document discusses the creation of the new Department of
Homeland Security, DHS, as the focus of efforts to secure the American homeland
from terrorist attacks. The DHS' 2004 strategic plan seeks to "gather and fuse
together all terrorism related intelligence&ldots;" DHS 2004:10). The
purposes of DHS is to participate in the deny and defend portion of Whitehouse
strategy, as well as "organize collective efforts" at overlapping federal,
state, and local levels, including "international partners" (53).
In many respects, intelligence network building is a part of
command and control of American homeland counterterrorism strategy. In the
aftermath of September 2001 attacks, the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS)
described the use of intelligence as the first line of defense against
terrorists. The 2002 strategy called for seamless and integrated warning
capabilities, new gathering methods, and the strengthening of the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI). The 2002 strategy also warned of the prospect of
groups conducting terrorist attacks inside the United States, which means that
there must be a fusion of information between law enforcement and the
intelligence community. In this area the United States has declared that early
warning of a terrorist attack is far more complex than the warning of a nuclear
attack by the Soviet Union. The Office of Homeland Security's July 2002
strategy document states that the "concept of intelligence and information
analysis is not a stand alone" concept but an integral component to protect the
nation (p.16). Under the heading of "National Vision" the collection and use of
intelligence information is considered the highest priority for Homeland
Security (Office of Homeland Security, July 2002).
Since the NSS of 2002, the major focus of American "national
vision" in counterterrorism efforts after 9/11 is in the area of intelligence,
intelligence sharing and decentralization. In 2004, the IRTPA also created the
DNI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counter Proliferation
Center and the National Intelligence Center. The National Counterterrorism
Center is located within the Office of the DNI and is tasked as "the primary
organization" in the United States for the analysis and integration of all
intelligence acquired by the United States Government. The Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center has the responsibility for the analysis of all
sources of intelligence both inside and outside of the United States, except
for purely domestic terrorism.
Todd Masse (2006) writes that there are three models under
consideration for homeland security intelligence strategy. The first is that
"top-down" approach that is federally driven and dominated by the traditional
intelligence, which is mainly foreign intelligence. The second model is the
"bottom up" approach, which is based on the criminal intelligence model of
assessing local environments for threats against national security. The third
model, which is advocated for DHS, is the more decentralized structure where
information is shared more widely and there is more coordination between law
enforcement and traditional intelligence actors. The holistic model is not
geographically bounded, constrained by levels of government, or the imagined
mistrust between government and private sectors. Masse refers to this model as
the "holistic" approach, as this model "recognizes no borders and is neither
'top down' nor "bottom up." It involves and values equally information
collected but the U.S. private sector owners of national critical
infrastructure, intelligence related to national security collected by federal,
state, local, tribal law enforcement officers" (4).
The building of collaboration for the United States involves
the identification of the enemy as opposing and attacking the values of the
United States and its allies. Al-Qaeda is viewed as a religiously motivated,
transnational enemy that views Western democracy as worthy of suicidal
violence, as discussed above. The method of the enemy is also important, as the
United States views this the starting point to build collaboration, both inside
the American homeland and with other nations. In the stated goals to defeat,
deny, diminish and defend with regard to terrorism and terrorist groups, the
United States seeks cooperation with partners, allies and international
organizations (The White House, February 2003).
The "building of collaboration" for the United States framed as
the building of mainly intelligence networks overseas to detect and deny
terrorist groups the ability to attack the American Homeland. The IRTPA,
consistent with the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927) the DNI "shall
coordinate the relationships between elements of the intelligence or security
services of foreign governments or international organizations on all matters
involving intelligence related to the national security or involving
intelligence acquired through clandestine means" (sec. 104a, f). The DHS in its
2004 strategic plan has declared that it is willing to involve "international
partners" is the disruption and denying international terrorist organizations.
Page 53 declares, "America will pursue a sustained, steadfast and systematic
international agenda to counter the global terrorist threat and improve our
homeland security."
Much of the United States' legitimizing of American
counterterrorism policy and actions are aimed as foreign audiences. For the
United States, the legitimizing and building of public trust is largely for a
foreign audience. According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, "we
&ldots;need a different and more comprehensive approach to public
information efforts that can help people around the world learn more and
understand America. The war is on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations"
(The White House 2002:31).
As part of the domestic institutional building agenda, DNI
Negroponte pointed out that the building of intelligence institutions and
information sharing must be done without damaging the "fabric and values of our
political culture." In the necessary work to bring together intelligence,
Negroponte states must include protecting privacy and civil liberties. There is
a need, according to Negroponte; to amend rules, policies and processes to
civil liberties and it is up to Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO) to
alert the DNI. (U.S. Chamber of Commerce July 2006, Intelligence Act P.L.
108-458 2004).
The CLPO was created in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 and
is "to ensure that the protection of civil liberties and privacy is
appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures" (P.L. 108-458 §
103D b.1), which also includes an overseer role of the DNI to the requirements
of the Constitution, privacy and civil liberties. Further protection goals
include the prevention of the erosion of privacy protections through the use of
technology and to insure that personal information in the system of records are
subject to the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 522a). The CPLO can refer
complaints to the Office of the Inspector General of the department or agency
of the appropriate intelligence community.
The first guiding principle in DHS's Strategic Plan is about
civil liberties:
"We will defend America while protecting the freedoms that
define America. Our strategies and actions will be consistent with the
individual rights and liberties enshrined by our Constitution and the Rule of
Law. While we seek to improve the way we collect and share information about
terrorists, we will nevertheless be vigilant in respecting the confidentiality
and protecting the privacy of our citizens. We are committed to securing our
nation while protecting civil rights and civil liberties."
Analysis. The DHS's strategic plan, entitled "Securing
Our Homeland" of 2004, appears to be primarily a public relations document of
"we wills" alongside nice pictures of counterterrorism and law enforcement
activities. The DHS is also looking for cooperation with the public, as well as
with building cultural and institutional cooperation with the elements of the
IC. In the Hoffman and Morrison-Taw framework, which refers mainly to domestic
political terrorism, the building of public trust in democracies involves
building measures that do not attack the public at large or innocent people
that have nothing to do with terrorism.
An well-known example of innocent people getting caught in a
type of terrorist drag net that has degraded the public legitimacy in America's
counterterrorism efforts is with "no fly" lists that are supposed to keep
terrorists off of flights or out of the United States. The "no-fly" lists are
becoming the butt of jokes as those deemed a "threat to aviation" has included
a Catholic nun that works for a federal agency and babies and young children
and Congressmen or their relatives, including Senator Ted Kennedy, have been
kept from boarding airliners. The main cause of travelers being placed on "no
fly" lists is name confusion with terrorist suspects using aliases. The "no
fly" lists have been trouble for the airlines, and false "hits" have caused
airliners to be diverted. The checks of names against the watch lists are not
completed until the plane is in the air (Wired News, 26 September 2005,
Associated Press 16 August 2005, CBS News 19 August 2004, Washington Post 25
May 2005).
While there are a lot of statements from officials, like DNI
John Negroponte regarding the protection of civil liberties, the "no fly"
lists, the lack of due process or openly stating the criteria a traveler ends
up on such a list, demonstrates what happens when there is a failure to advance
liberty along with security - which keeps public trust high. Such measures also
create public resentment, according to Hoffman and Morrison-Taw "measures
directed at terrorists often become focused on the population at large, and the
government must spend precious recourses courting the public, having already
alienated it" (2000:14). According to Esther Brimmer (2006) homeland security
also involves the protection of civil liberties and the preservation of the
character of the values we seek to defend.
There is also, according to Daniel Hamilton (2006), the
perception in the international community of legitimacy and trust in America's
war on terrorism. The abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, according to
Hamilton, have shaken confidence in the American administration, and this has
lead to a loss of legitimacy and effectiveness of for the anti-terrorism
campaign. Hamilton argues that the nature of terrorism is such that maintaining
the appearance of justice and democratic legitimacy is more important than in
"routine" wars. Hamilton also argues that ad hoc measures that are void of our
societal values and defined legal proceedings provide little in the way of
long-term cooperation with other parts of the international community. The view
offered by Hoffman-Morrison-Taw is that foreign assistance and collaboration
can be helpful, but it can be very critical in obtaining intelligence, legal
assistance agreements and where terrorist groups plan attacks outside the
target nation. Whether the perceptions are real or exaggerated, the erode trust
in America's commitment to values and cause a loss in the effectiveness in the
war on terrorism. (Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 2000, Hamilton 2006).
Hoffman-Morrison-Taw believe that the creation of a command and
coordination structure, a unified structure to carry out counterterrorism plans
and policies. The authors point out at length that such a structure can help in
the efficient use of intelligence, and intelligence should be centralized:
"Intelligence should be centralized, so that a single office
functions as a clearing house for the collation, analysis and effective
dissemination of all intelligence. [W]hatever command and control structure is
implanted at the federal levels of government should be reproduced throughout
the sub-federal levels of government, so&ldots;intelligence-gathering
organizations&ldots;are represented at every level" (Hoffman and
Morrison-Taw 2000:12).
Prior to September 2001, the successful prosecution of the
first attack on the World Trade Center including uncovering evidence of a
growing threat against America. The investigators and prosecutors had assembled
people, places and things about the attack, including a plot to bomb New York
landmarks, such as the Holland and Lincoln tunnels. The impression left by the
superb efforts of those involved in the prosecution of the first attack on the
World Trade center was that the crime was solved and those responsible were
found guilty. Justice was served and that was the end of the story. The purpose
of the law enforcement efforts in this case were to prove the guilt of those
arrested and charged with crimes, not conduct intelligence analysis. This
process was not intended to reflect upon the new threat to the security of the
United States (The 9/11 Commission 2004). The evidence collected for
prosecution, methods of planning and finance, according to the 9/11 Report,
contained a set of harbingers of the next attack on the World Trade Center.
The Office of National Counterterrorism Center and its director
have the stated mission goals of collecting and analyzing all information of
possible terrorist threats against the United States. The 9/11 Report called
for the "unity of effort" in managing intelligence with the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence to oversee national intelligence centers. The
9/11 Report also recommended a balance between security and shared knowledge,
much of which is part of IC culture, and should be replaced with a "need to
share" culture of integration.
A slightly different view is shared in the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States on the IC's "traditional"
culture. The WMD Report advocates the retention of the different agency culture
style, as this creates competition among the agencies in the testing of
intelligence hypotheses creates "diverse pockets of expertise" (312). The
report states that successes can be attributed to ad hoc efforts, but mainly
cross agency efforts. While the advantages of single agency efforts should be
retained, the WMD Report also advocates the building of a coordinated
intelligence community ("WMD Report" 31 March 2005).
Homeland security directors stated in a 2006 survey that there
is a need for greater federal coordination with the states on policies and
rulemaking. The state directors feel that they are not given representation and
complain "broad state input" is from a few hand selected state officials, and
even then, the input from those selected officials is often ignored. The survey
also indicated that 70% of homeland security directors regarded the creation of
a state intelligence fusion center a top priority, and 20% have implemented
federal guidelines. Over half of the homeland security directors were somewhat
dissatisfied with the intelligence that they receive from the federal
government and 55 percent were dissatisfied with the quality of the
intelligence they receive from the federal government. The majority of state
homeland security directors did report that they have strategic plans and have
coordinated response plans with local first responders in the event of
terrorism (NGA Center 2006, Washington Post 2006).
An article from the law enforcement site, Officer.com,
indicates that some real progress is occurring with the intelligence fusion
centers. While admitting that the building of cooperation and stronger
relationships among federal, state and local agencies takes time, the
connections and innovations are being made at a good pace. An example is the
Terrorism Early Warning Group in Los Angeles, which is a multidisciplinary
fusion center that disseminates information, facilitates information sharing,
and bolsters terrorism prevention and response capabilities. This local fusion
center works with all levels of government, notably the state fusion center. In
a couple of years the efforts will pay off in the form of a seamless exchange
of intelligence information (Officer.com 6 November 2006).
Conclusion. Despite the claims of problems with the
development of intelligence sharing within the IC, the article from Officer.com
is an encouraging sign. The change of the current culture toward more sharing
of intelligence information is a process that requires time and efforts. The
success of the local fusion center in California could be the positive tread
toward a culture of information sharing and "target development." A future
concern could be for the preservation of civil liberties and privacy in the
area of "target development." The concern for civil liberties, as stated by
John Negroponte, should be just more than an afterthought in the emerging
American counterterrorism paradigm.
Hoffman and Morrison-Taw pointed out that the best
counterterrorism policies for a democratic society is to place the protection
of civil liberties first and build the trust of the public. There appears that
no action or the wrong kind of action taken to involve foreign collaboration in
the protection of America's homeland. The trust of America's allies should also
be built and American should rectify perceived violations of international
norms. The State Department, which is mentioned as having a valuable role in
America's national security policy documents, should have a more out-in-front
role in building relationships with foreign governments that are aimed at
American Homeland security.
The celebration of civil liberties by DNI John Negroponte and
DHS should be taken more seriously. The "no fly" lists are an excellent example
of an ad hoc program that appears to place little concern for the civil
liberties of the public, especially the civil liberties of the vast majority
who have the misfortune of being placed on the lists. The "no fly" lists, which
are supposedly are intended to keep terrorists off of airplanes, appear to hurt
innocent people more than catch real terrorists. The most important policy of a
successful counterterrorism strategy is to create and use policies that do not
seek repressive measures against the wide swath of the public that serve only
to destroy the public trust. The wide spread stories of nuns, babies and a
well-known U.S Senator being subject to "no fly" lists also gives victory to
those that seek the disruption of democratic values and the freedom of movement
that mark a free society.
The use of better and more coordinated actionable intelligence to
track people and groups that pose a real danger will enable the problematic and
faulty "no fly" lists to become obsolete. If a threatening person or group is
present in the United States, then the threat should be well known and action
taken long before an operative attempts to board an airliner. Well-coordinated
and actionable intelligence is necessary to maintain our free society, civil
liberties and to avoid hurting innocent people, while at the same time
capturing the real terrorists. .
*Final note: This was a class
research paper that will be used in the future to create frameworks to study
the differences between European and American conceptions human rights, human
dignity, data protection in the areas of policing and security. A good paper on
the differences between the Us and Europe on human rights and justice -
European
Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Anti-Terrorism
Data-Mining.
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