How to see the EU in an International
Crisis: "Much to do about a statement"
ESLaPorte - March 5, 2010
Introduction
In December 2009, there was a "leak" about the wording of an
upcoming Council statement that caused a flurry of lobbying actions by both
Israel and the Palestine Authority in the national capitals of EU Member
States. This statement proposed by the Swedish Presidency was to be one that
declared East Jerusalem as the "capital of a future Palestinian state."
The reaction of the Israeli side was condemnation, but the prospect of such a
statement was welcomed by the Palestinian side. This "leak" was then jumped
upon by target actors, the players, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, who
began vying for their wished for versions of the statement from the Council, or
the Council of the European Union.
Now - our view is to witness how the prospect of the wording
of this statement from the Council affects the behavior of the two target
actors, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and their domestic and
international actions in response. This is actually an easy scenario as the
relationship in terms of association agreements and the like, are not at stake,
and neither is aid, trade and the like. Most EU actions involve, say, something
like sanctions against an actor, a target nation, to bring it back compliance
with EU desires and demands. There are no membership aspirations for either
Israel or the Palestinian Authority, but there are acceptable forms of
response, for example, shooting rockets would be an unacceptable action over
this statement.
We need to have two questions in mind:
Question 1: Did the EU's output
(the prospect of a statement calling on East Jerusalem to be a capital of a
Palestinian state) accomplish its intended goal, as stated by European leaders,
ministers in the Council and Member State governments?
Question 2: What does this tell
us about how "valued" the European Union is as a member of the Quartet?
The straight wording of the second question helps you to
visualize the way the target actors, Israel or the Palestinian Authority,
"value" the EU and take measures for an EU action (Council statement) that is
favorable to their side. This action also is about the EU's own "presence" in
the relationship with the target actors. An off question here is would the same
lobbying efforts be on display for Russia's or even the U.S.'s statement.
Remember, the EU is a regional organization made up 27 nations, like France and
the United Kingdom, members of the Security Council, as well as other important
middle powers, like Germany.
What you first need to know
What are the current relationships between the European
Union and the actor(s) in the crisis. Knowing the relationships between the
actor(s) and the EU is helpful to analysis of the EU's "presence" in the
crisis. Is one or more of the actors in the crisis seeking EU membership? The
desire or lack of desire for European Union membership on the part of crisis
actors alters the EU's "presence." The EU has leverage over actors that are
part of a crisis and seeking EU membership and the actor has a stake in how the
EU, as a whole, sees the prospective member's ability to, say, "act European"
in the crisis. In this situation, the EU has more of a "presence" and is able
to influence the prospective member in a crisis.
However, the relationship does not need to include desire
for EU membership for the EU to have "presence" in a crisis. The "presence"
that the EU projects can be present in issues and well as full-blown crisis
situations. We see examples of the EU's presence in the Middle East conflict
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. We will look at two events over the
Middle East conflict, but first we must take a short look at the relationship
that both parties, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, have with the European
Union and the role that EU plays in the conflict.
Backgrounds.
We first find on the Commission's website on the page that
presents the EU's positions that the EU's foremost position is "is a two-state
solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living
side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours."
We then go to the Commission's website and find that the
European Commission is the biggest donor to the Palestinian Authority. The
Commission's page about the "Occupied Palestinian Territory" states that the EU
has been working with the Palestinian Authority to build institutions that will
support and independent and democratic Palestinian State (European Commission.
2009).
We see in the association agreement that the EU has with
Israel of 2000 is called the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement and its chief aim is
toward political dialog and to promote harmonious relations in the areas of
economic and trade activities between the Community (European Union) and
Israel. The agreement appears to be aimed at bring Israel closer to the
Community through economic activities, which are carried out in the spirit of
European values (European Commission 2000).
According to the Action Plan that exists between the EU and
the Palestinian Authority (PA), the EU is welcomed in the relationship to enter
into political, security, and the like, in a shared responsibility in conflict
prevention and resolution. The relationship between the EU and PA will, as is
the usual practice on the part of the EU in such agreements, depend upon the
"degree of commitment to common values" (European Commission 2005).
The European Union is part of what is called the "Madrid
Quartet," or just the Quartet." The Quartet was formed in the summer of 2002 by
the Bush administration at a conference in Madrid. The purpose of the Quartet
was to involve the international community in the negations for a settlement
for a two-state solution. The creation of the Quartet reflects the failure of
EU common strategy in the Middle East processes when EU official from the EU's
CFSP were not allowed by Israel to meet with Arafat. The EU was given the task
of formulating a "road map," but the road map that was presented by the US was
the draft that was accepted, which was backed by the EU (Musu date unknown,
University of California Press, 2003). The road map provides for conditions
that the Palestinian must follow to end violence. According to Musu (?):
The EU hoped that participation in the Madrid Quartet
would gain the EU more visibility and influence in the peace process, and would
provide Europe with a tool for influencing American policies as they were
formulated (6).
We have a basic grasp of the EU's
relationship with both actors, Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
What are the issues and what are the issues of the current crisis. Here, we use
both newspaper coverage and statements form the EU and the actors about the
issue or issues in a crisis. For example, a while back the EU foreign ministers
of the Council loudly and forcefully proclaimed that Jerusalem should be both
the capital for Israelis and Palestinians. Let's look at some newspaper
articles (data) about the issue of this statement by the European Union
(including the actual December 8 statement) from the foreign ministers in the
Council of the European Union, the main foreign policy body of the EU.
"Much to do about a
statement"
First the European Union statement on the prospect of a
two capital solution for Jerusalem. We first see, on 7 December, that
Deutsche Presse-Agentur that the "leaked drafts" of the ministers' joint
statements were intended to be strong, especially at Israel. One EU minister
stated that "the time has come to raise pressure" and "it is unacceptable if
nothing moves." Arthur Beesley wrote in the Irish Times on December 9, 2009
that the European Union "is seriously concerned about the progress in the
Middle East peace process." EU's foreign ministers also believed, reports
Beesley, that a way must be found for Jerusalem to become the capital for
Israel and a Palestinian state.
We then read the article from the Jerusalem Post by Herb
Keinon (December 1, 2009) that the reaction of the Israeli government to the
Swedish presidency proposal of East Jerusalem as the capital of a future
Palestinian state was to deplore the proposal. From the European Jewish Press
we read about the same strong reaction from the Israeli government to that
proposal in the Jerusalem Post. The main arguments of the Israelis were that
such a statement of a "Palestinian" capital in "East" Jerusalem would damage
the impartiality and credibility of the European Union in the peace process and
that such a proposal should be a part of mediation (Deutsche Presse-Agentur
December 7, 2009; Auther December 9, 2009; Keinon December 1, 2009; Yossi,
December 7, 2009).
The prospect for a strong statement from the Swedish EU
presidency was warmly received by the Palestinian side. For their part, the
Palestinian side, the Palestinian Authority held intense contacts in support of
the Swedish proposal that would advocate "East Jerusalem as the capital of a
Palestinian state" over the Israeli desired draft of "two capitals to the two
states." Jordan's King Abdullah II hailed the Swedish proposal for a
Palestinian capital and also demanded that the EU help put an end to Isreali
settlement building and unilateral actions in Jerusalem (Agence France Press,
December 6, 2009).
However, the Palestinians faced intense lobbying efforts in
Member States by the Isrealis which had an effect on France, Holland, Germany,
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as pressure from the United
States. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu managed to talk to the leaders of
several European leaders and even encouraged the U.S. to "impress" upon the
Europeans that "modalities should be left for negotiations." Most observers
believed that Isreal would win the lobbying war in what its diplomats would
eventually describe as a brusing diplomatic battle in national capitals.
(Lempkowicz, December 7, 2009; Yunus Dec 7 2009).
The MEAT of The
Statement:"The Council is deeply concerned about the situation
in East Jerusalem. In view of recent incidents it calls on all parties to
refrain from provocative actions. The Council recalls that it has never
recognized the annexation of East Jerusalem. If there is to be a genuine peace,
a way must be found through negotiation to resolve the status of Jerusalem as
the future capital of two states. The Council calls for the reopening of
Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem in accordance with the Road map. It also
calls on the Israeli government to cease all discriminatory treatment of
Palestinians in East Jerusalem" (Council of the European Union, December 8,
2010).
The actors' final reations
The watered down text (highlighted above) was viewed as a
victory for the Israelis by the Washington Times in contrast to the
Palestinians in a bid for international support, especially for the Swedish
text. The rational was that the lack of U.S. mediated peace talks led
Palestinians to appeal their case to the United Nations and the European Union.
The Israelis did not claim open diplomatic victory and were disappointed that
the final statement did not call on the Palestinians to return to the peace
talks table. American Jewish Committee still found the statement an improvement
over the original Swedish text, but found both the idea of a dual capital
troubling and the lack of demand that the Palestinians return to talks. The
notion of Jerusalem as a joint capital was something that many EU leaders have
promoted in the past, including Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. There has
partial note by the Council of the stoppage of Israeli settlements on the west
Bank was more that the original text. After this statement, there was largely
condemnation by the Israeli side, with the view by an Israeli diplomat that the
issue of the Council statement "left a bad taste in our mouth" and that
Swedish-Israeli ties had been damaged in the "bruising diplomatic battle." The
EU, according to the Israelis, would have damaged itself with the Swedish
statement. The adaption of the milder statement was the "EU saving itself."
(Keinon, December 9, 2009).
Yet, Palestinian leaders welcomed that statement calling it
"a better sense of hope about tomorrow" and hoped that the statement would help
relaunch peace talks. Even as the Council dropped the statement, it refused to
recognize any changes in the pre-1967 with regard to East Jerusalem. The
Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Eratat, stated that the conclusions were welcomed
and that the hopes for peace rested upon the upholding international law and
that a peace solution will only be found through vigorous participation from
the international community. The EU remains an advocate for a two-state
solution for the Middle East conflict and that is described as being the reason
for the advocacy of a dual capital for Jerusalem (Schneider January 2, 2010;
Keinion December 9, 2009; States News Service December 9, 2010; Lekic, December
8, 2009; The Malaysian New Agency, December 10, 2009).
The aftermath of The Statement - Our Analysis
Our first chore in this
analysis, and in all analyses, is to determine what the results of the
issue or crisis were that the EU was taking action. Here, we have the prospect
of East Jerusalem being named by European foreign ministers as the capital of a
future Palestinian state in a Council foreign affairs statement. For our
analysis we will call the prospect of a statement that would call for East
Jerusalem to be a capital for a Palestinian state the EU output.
Second, we identify the actors that
are reacting to the EU's output. This task will also help us determine
the EU's presence; if this presence is what the EU "is" or what the EU "does."
We know from our data that the two main actors are Israel and the Palestinians,
with secondary actors of the United States and the supporters of both Israel
and the Palestinians.
We now get back to answer our opening questions ...
Question 1: Did the EU's
output (the prospect of a statement calling on East Jerusalem to be a capital
of a Palestinian state) accomplish its intended goal, as stated by European
leaders, ministers in the Council and Member State governments? Keep in
mind here that we are not looking into the domestic politics of the Member
States in this analysis model, but into the rational for European Union action
onto the international arena while engaging an international-level crisis or
other issue. The domestic political reasons why France under President Sarkozy
opposed the Swedish statement are not important. However, the domestic
political reactions to an EU output of both target actors, Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, that translate into foreign policy actions are an
important part of the analysis.
Also, we can only view statements from EU leaders as to the
rational for the EU action. For our issue here, the stated aim for the EU for a
"strong" statement on Jerusalem was to speed up what it saw as stalled peace
talks and to bring the parties, especially Israel, back to the table. There
could be side issues, such as the building of settlements by the Israelis, that
could be a part of the EU's intended action, but we do not see this rational
stated by EU leaders as reasons for the "strong" statement. An important part
of gauging the effects of an EU foreign policy action is to view future
statements and actions of target actors. This analysis is limited when used in
an unfolding issue or crisis (which is still occurring at the time of this
writing). We can see later statements and actions from the EU and other actors
both in the statements to determine the full results of an EU foreign policy
action. Better results are found with the passage of time after the EU's action
on an issue or crisis.
Actors'
Actions
European Union OUTPUT:
Possible statement out of the Council by ministers that advocates East
Jerusalem as a "capital of a Palestinian state."
Israel REACTION:
Condemnation -chiefly directed at EU
itself.
Intensive lobbying of EU leaders in national
capitals
Obtained verbal support from the U.S.
Palestine REACTION:
Welcomed possible statement
Lobbied national capitals
Obtained support from neighboring
countries
Table 1. Actors' main actions laid out for easy
viewing.
Question 2: What does this
tell us about how "valued" the European Union is as a member of the Quartet?
When we lay out the reactions, which includes policy actions, of the two
target actors, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, we see that the prospect
of this provocative statement, and look at news coverage of the importance of
this potential statement, we see that the presence of the European Union is
both "presence" is "Considerable." We see reactions to this possible statement
that resulted in a flurry of lobbying activity by both sides, but especially
Israel, in Member State national capitals. This tells us that the EU has a
definate presence in the Middle East peace process and part of what the EU "is"
- a bloc of 27 Member States- is what is important to the actors. When these
extra actions occured on the part of the Palestinians and Israelis, the EU's
"profile" was raised - but the actions on the part of the two target actors
indicates that the EU had a "high profile" to begin with.
Level of impact
Nil
Marginal
Considerable
Significant
Degree of influence
none
General/indirect
Major beneficial or
adverse effects
Major
beneficial or adverse effects on vital interests
Quality of influence
none
Beneficial or
adverse effects
Major
beneficial or adverse effects
Major beneficial or
adverse effects on vital interests
Modification of
behavior/policy
none
none
yes
yes
Measure of effect of EU action
empirical
empirical
Cognitive/empirical
Cognitive/empirical
empirical
Presence
none
yes
yes
yes
Capacity
none
none
yes
yes
Significance
none
none
some
yes
Table 3.1 - Levels of impact of EU's external political
impact based on Ginsberg's model.
"Nil"- The EU has nil impact when it, acting alone or
with other actors, takes, or tries to take, an action that does not succeed as
intended, or when it chooses not to act when it could have under its competence
of CSFP.
"Marginal" - According to Ginsberg, the EU has
marginal impact when its "action or inaction may have beneficial or adverse
impact on non-member (target actor" interests, but does not product a change or
modification in the behavior or domestic, foreign, or security policy of a
non-member." Both cognitive and empirical measures point to marginal impact
(Ginsberg 2001, 53).
"Considerable" - The EU has considerable impact when,
acting alone or with others, tangibly influences the domestic, foreign and/or
security policy, interests, or behavior of an non-member.
"Significant" -The EU, when acting alone or with
others, is primary and directly responsible for the change in the behavior of
domestic, foreign or security policy of a non-member that would not have
occurred in the absence of the EU stimulus (Ginsberg 2001, 52-54).
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