Introduction. The Balkans conflicts saw some of the most
sadistic ethnic violence in Europe in 50 plus years. According to Rozen (2001),
the nationalism and ethnic strife followed from the economic hard-times that
were stirred on by globalization and the negative effects on political and
social cohesion. The conditions gave rise to murderous nationalists, like
Slobodan Milosevic and leaders like Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic,
who were eventually indicted for war crimes in the Balkans Conflicts. The
failure of the UN in the Balkans' conflict was a let down for those who saw it
as a foundation for global cooperation. The failure of international
organizations eventually brought the United States and NATO into the conflict
against the Bosnian Serbs after the "CNN effect" and the massacre at Srebrenica
of Bosnian men and boys (Rozen 2001).
Rozen argues at the end of her essay that the hope for closure
in the horrific chapter of the Balkans' conflict is "Europeanization" of the
region. Europeanization and the prospect of joining Europe is a powerful new
tool that had a positive effect on Serbia- Montenegro, among the other Eastern
European nations. The prospect of association and relationship with Europe is
proving to be a powerful, non-military tool of both security and integration.
Before the October 2000 election that drove Slobodan Milosevic out of power,
Yugoslavia's and Serbia's democratic reformers have dreamed of European Serbia.
The idea of European integration as a means of obtaining security includes a
Europe "without holes."
This development of using non-military means in European
foreign policy has been described in the Solana Paper, or the European Security
Strategy. The Union also views non-military crisis management as essential to
resolving a conflict by more efficient means. The means and method by which the
Europeans fulfill their security goals involves mainly non-military means and
by what Mark Leonard calls "passive aggression" and non-military "preventative
engagement." This involves with prospective members, like Serbia, the "setting
of conditions" for constructive engagement (Leonard 2004). The setting of
conditions in relations between the European Union and Serbia through the
prospect of ever closer associations leads to a reformulation of national
identity, which is viewed as preconditions for "a more secure Europe and a
better world" and a future European Serbia.
Theoretical Prospective. This paper uses social
constructivist theoretical framework from European integration and political
cooperation, in contrast to the realism-rational choice perspective.
Realist-rational choice assumptions about European cooperation embrace the
nation-state unit and the interests of single European member states, which
will usually block integration in areas of foreign and security policy.
According to realists, national actors come to intuitions to shape them to
their national policy preferences. To the social constructivists, national
preferences are shaped by actors whose preferences are first being shaped by
the institutions in which the actors interact. The institutions are understood
to consist of formal and informal norms and expected, socially constructed
rules of appropriate behavior in the institutional setting. It is the social
constructivist view is that the European Union is re-shaping the national
identities and preferences rather than the European Union shaped by national
actors for national interests (Glarbo 2001; Pollack 2005; Checkel 2001).
National identities and key leaders are also molded in response
to interaction with regional institutions. According to Checkel (2005)
interaction involves the changing of attitudes and persuasion about cause and
effect without threats or covert action. Checkel further argues that rational
choice scholarship often emphasizes the strategic and manipulative persuasion
rather than persuasion to change people's minds and act as an engine of
socialization. Socialization can only occur if the identity construction is
both consensual and internalized, and therefore, become imbedded in a national
political culture (Checkel 2001, 2005; Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse and
Daniela Engelmann-Martin, et al. 2001).
The work on the national identity construction of "Europe" and
what is "European" in the political order is highlighted in work by Martin
Marcussen, Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin, et al (2001). There are
three factors that will give a better understanding of national identity is
acquired in relation to "Europe." The first is the new vision of political
order must resonate within the existing political order and national culture.
Ole Weaver (1998) also advances the idea that "Europe" must make sense within
the national political culture and fit within the rules of domestic
discourse.
Second, the political leaders must chose those ideas that are
of their interests and at a "critical juncture" when national identity is
contested and challenged in political discourses. What Marcussen, Risse and
Engelmann-Martin et al, define as a "critical juncture," and is important in
this study of Serbia-Montenegro journey toward "Europe," is that national
identity construction is most open to change in situations that are perceived
as crisis situations and policy failures, including external events. Crisis
events in the history have challenged national identities, such as the Nazi
experience for German national identity in the aftermath of World War Two
(Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin, et al: 2001).
Finally, the third factor suggested by Marcussen, Risse and
Engelmann-Martin, et al, is the national identity that emerges resonates among
the political majority, is internalized and instutionalized and then becomes
resistant to change. Connie Robinson (2003) writes that a new national identity
must be a compromise in the current political and social context that allows
unity among diverse groups until the new political and social tradition can
take hold. Ole Waever argues that the idea of "Europe" is not seen to replace
the nation-state, but as an additional layer of national identity. European
identity is phrased as political identity that does not replace the
ethno-cultural identity of nations or regions.
An additional argument from Ole Waever is the concept of
"Europe" as a struggle between integration and fragmentation. Integration is
viewed as necessary for the security rhetoric of "Europe" as the alternative is
fragmentation, which is viewed as the possible destruction of "Europe." So,
security follows with European integration and Europeanization is a
prerequisite for integration into Europe. This is outlined in the EU's document
on the Stabilization and Association process that leads to further integration
into European structures (Ole Weaver 1998; European Commission 26 March
2003).
Defining "Europeanization" - First, it is important to
develop a working definition of "Europeanization" for this paper. Definitions
of "Europeanization" among scholars vary widely, but definitions stress the
feature of governance that charactize the European Union that are exported
beyond European borders. Most definitions access the impact of Europeanization
on non-European Union member that sought closer relationship with the Union for
the purpose of eventual membership. Generally, Europeanization is defined as
"European rules, mechanisms and collective understandings that interact with
national, domestic standards" (Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci and Bruno
Coppieters, et al. 2004).
The Stabilization and Association process is viewed by the
European Commission as "an agenda for the countries to reform and adapt
European values and norms." Conditionality is coupled with various types of
support, but progress is dependent upon the political will of the nation to
integrate into EU structures. The EU also values popular support of the
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) and popular understanding and
visibility of the integration process" (European Commission March 26 2003:
5).
The first task to gage Europeanization in the form of national
compliance with European Union Stabilization and Association standards is to
locate EU official statements, agreements, action plans and partnership
documents that demonstrate the relationship between the European Union and the
prospective member. To get the most out of process tracing methodology,
according to Checkel (2005) involves much time and data, which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
To view process trace the Europeanization of Serbia-Montenegro,
the ability to gage the modification of behavior and governmental actions of
the official and leaders of Serbia-Montenegro to requirements and standards of
European Union association need to be viewed. These behavior changes that are
evidence of Europeanization can be viewed through two ways. The first are the
official reports and papers on European policy compliance put out by European
Union structures that monitor Serbia-Montenegro State Union progress toward
required European goals. The second is to view the speeches and actions of
government officials through newspaper accounts, which includes the statements
from government officials.
The purpose of this paper is to chart Serbia's progress toward
European integration using the social constructivist theoretical framework and
to make policy recommendations. It is a first study paper that has a focus on
the post-Milosevic drive by the Kostunica government to integrate into European
structures and the superficial changes in Serbian national identity and
policies in response to European demands. The study of every aspect and
definition of "European values and norms" is beyond the scope of this paper.
This paper has a few limitations in a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of
European integration involving Kosovo, as well as Serbia-Montenegro culture,
and these are well beyond the scope of this paper. This focus is on progress
toward changing Yugoslavia/Serbia-Montenegro/Serbia's national identity from
the past under Slobodan Milosevic to orienting Serbia's national behavior
toward European standards.
Also viewed by this paper are the lingering effects of Serbian
militant nationalism on integrating Serbia into European structures. The
intended result is to integrate Serbia-Montenegro (Serbia and Montenegro) into
European structures - and this provides for a more secure Europe.
How the European Union helped beat the Milosevic regime. Prior
to the October 2000 elections, European Union foreign ministers held out the
prospect of closer association and the lifting of sanctions. As hope to
Serbia's democratic opposition the European Union issued this statement:
"On 24 September, the people of Serbia will be faced with a
critical choice. The elections give the Serbian people the possibility of
repudiating clearly and peacefully Milosevic's policies, which consist of
political manipulation, the deprivation of freedom, impoverishment" (qtd. in
Joyon Naegle, 19 September 2000).
At a pre-election rally of 25,000 supporters in Nis, the
opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, declared that upon election he would
work to "return the country to the European fold". At a rally in April 2000,
attended by 100,000 people, Kostunica rebuked NATO's actions against his
country a year earlier and stated that he "found it hard to believe that people
are killed, exhausted and starved by sanctions&ldots;for their own
benefit." Despite the denunciations of the West at this rally, the political
platform of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) included pro-European
statements about European Serbia. The democratic opposition sought to
reorganize Serbia and normalize relations with other nations, to include
integration into European structures and to join the Council of Europe. Law and
order and the fight against crime, openness and an independent courts system
were also top goals of the democratic opposition (BDnet News 14 April 2000;
Associated Press 14 April 2000; BDnet News 3 March 2000).
The democratic opposition to Milosevic regime had asked for the
October 2000 revolution at the ballot box that was aided by the European Union.
Between November 1999 and Spring 2000, the EU gave fuel oil to seven Serbian
cities that were governed by the democratic opposition, despite Milosevic's
attempts to block EU aid.
By at least the Spring of 2000, the EU gave aid to the
harassed, democratic opposition after the Milosevic regime attempted to stop
meetings and arrested students and journalists. Some of the actions on the part
of the Milosevic regime included beating of people gathering for rallies. Otpor
activists were beaten and tortured and held for charges of "terrorism." People
were indicted for "spreading for false information." In the middle of this, the
European Union stated that it "supports the legitimate struggle of Serbian
people for freedom and democracy." After the defeat of Milosevic, in November
2000, the European Union pledged 2.5 billion euros over five years. The final
rejection of Milosevic occurred in late December of 2000 and Zoran Djindjic
promised a full recovery and a full investigation of Milosevic much to the
delight of the European Union (BDNet News 10 May 2000; Human Rights Watch 2001;
BDNet News 25 November 2000; Cable News Network 25 December 2000).
The conclusions of the Thessaloniki Council of June 2003
stopped short of promising membership for the Western Balkans, but did promise,
"directing the reform efforts of the Western Balkan countries in coming closer
to the Union" (Council of the European Union 20 June 2003: 13). Support for a
regional approach to security that is focused on the Western Balkans was also
echoed at the Thessaloniki Council with regard external relations and security
policy aimed at "guaranteeing a secure Europe and a better world". The
promotion of conflict prevention through regional cooperation, reflected at
Thessaloniki, is also a theme of the European Security Strategy of December
2003 (Council of the European Union 20 June 2003).
A main objective of Serbia-Montenegro government under Vojislav
Kostunica has been European integration. The European Union has provided policy
advice to Serbia-Montenegro since 2001in the form of the EU-FRY Consultive Task
Force (CTF). The CTF was replaced by the Enhance Permanent Dialogue, which
monitors and drives reforms of the European Partnership adapted by the Council
of Ministers and the corresponding implementation plan of December 2004
(Council of the European Union 20 June 2003).
The process of bringing Serbia- Montenegro closer to Europe is
to result, eventually, in a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),
which is viewed as a process toward eventual European Union membership. The
European Partnership of June 2004 sets out requirements for European Union
compatibility in all areas of governance for both Serbia and Montenegro,
including Kosovo. Beside EU compatibility there are the requirements of
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the UNSCR 1244 for Kosovo. The first European Partnership of 2004
was replaced with the European Partnership of 30 January 2006 and is intended
to commit Serbia-Montenegro to an even deeper relationship with Europe. The
second European Partnership has a large dose of Justice and Home Affairs,
especially with regard to Kosovo (Official Journal of the European Union 2 July
2006).
A report from the European Commission (EC) from March 2003
describes the SAAs as a prospect for nations to reform and adapt European
values and norms. The same 2003 report chided Serbia-Montenegro's political
leaders for "much to be desired behavior," such as confrontational approaches,
personal agendas, obstruction and corruption, and the EC cited low voter
turnout in elections as loss of public confidence in the political system
(European Commission 26 March 2003; European Commission. 12 April 2005 ).
The report on Serbia's progress toward the SAA negotiations
from April 2005 stated that Serbia had made significant progress in meeting its
obligations in regard to the cooperation with the ICTY, including improvement
in access to documents and witnesses. Also, human and minority rights had also
improved, along with improvements in respect for the freedom of speech. The
European Commission declared that Serbia was in a position to assume the
obligation resulting from an SSA in the area of the movement of workers,
capital, services and goods. Despite the need for further improvements the
European Commission declared that Serbia was ready for an SSA in April 2005
(European Commission 12 April 2005).
The work toward European Serbia. In a 21 September 2001 paper
put out by the International Crisis Group chided the administration of
President Vojislav Kostunica for nationalism and neglecting need political,
judicial and social reforms. The ICG paper accuses Kostunica and his Democratic
Party of Serbia (DSS) of conservative nationalism that was "preserving certain
elements of the Milosevic legacy" (International Crisis Group 2001:11). The
accusations against the Kostunica Government are that it employs leftovers from
the Milosevic era, dodges cooperation with the ICTY, and holds tacit supports
for the "greater Serbia" fantasy. The DSS, along with the Democratic Opposition
of Serbia (DOS), the main party opposing the Milosevic regime, were united
against Milosevic's attempts to obstruct election results and were in agreement
to extradite Milosevic to The Hague prior to formation of the Republican
government in December 2000 (European Commission 12 April 2005; International
Crisis Group 2001).
The ICG paper describes Kostunica and his DSS party as the most
popular, due to Kostunica's personal standing. At the time the ICG paper was
written, there was a perception on the part of DOS leader and then Prime
Minister Zoran Djindjic that pushing forward economic and social reforms could
cause turmoil. The Serbian government avoided educating the public on the
reforms that were being instated for pro-European standards. The popularity of
the Kostunica government was used by pro-Western reformer Djindjic to push
difficult reforms and transition measures. For his part, Kostunica did not use
his office to block reform, but he did not come out in clear support for
reforms. The one that was accused of "clinging to Serbia's past" was Serbia's
president Kostunica, who often feuded with the pro-West, reform-minded Zoran
Djindjic. The Kostunica government was reluctant to challenge the passive and
broad backing (at that time) for Serbian nationalism and the Republika Srpska
(International Crisis Group, 21 September 2001; Dusan Stojanovic 22 March
2002).
Djindjic would subsequently be the victim of assassination on
12 March 2003, and this tragic event would be another changing crisis for
Serbia. However, the reaction to the murder of pro-Europe, pro-West reformer PM
Djindjic by elements of the past Milosevic regime was a reminder that elements
from Serbia's dark past were involved in police services and organized crime,
along with the need to reform the ailing judiciary which threatened the rule of
law in the country. The European Commission reports commend the memory of
Djindjic drive to build democracy and bring Serbia out of international
isolation. Djindjic was the victim of those militant national that still long
for the murderous Milosevic days and want to halt the work toward European
Serbia. (European Commission, 26 March 2003; European Commission, 2004;
European Commission 12 April 2005). The Commission pledged its full support
behind those are fighting and resisting the elements of Serbia's past that were
behind the murder of Djindjic and seek to destroy Serbian democracy.
The requirement for ICTY cooperation and Serbian militant
nationalism as a stumbling block. After the October 2000 elections
Kostunica acknowledged that Milosevic was "one of those responsible" for
atrocities in Bosnia and Croatia. While stating that Serbs were also killed,
the newly elected Yugoslav president also stated "I am ready to accept guilt
for all those people that have been killed." In another interview with a
Macedonian television Kostunica stated, "any cooperation with the ICTY in The
Hague in the case of Milosevic will destabilize the situation in Yugoslavia."
In an interview, Kostunica dismissed the ICTY as a "tool of U.S. foreign
policy" (Joyon Naegle 25 October 2000.).
The major stumbling block keeping Serbia locked out of further
European integration through the SAA process is the full cooperation with the
ICTY and especially the arrest of General Ratko Mladic. In late April of 2002,
President Bush sent a letter to Yugoslavian Government encouraging full
cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and that Serbia's entrance into NATO's
Partnership for Peace program depended upon full cooperation with the ICTY. The
question of the surrender of indicted General Mladic is now the only obstacle
holding Serbia from the SAA and further European integration. After Montenegro
voted in 2006 for independence, EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solona made
clear the European demand for the surrender of Mladic is an absolute condition
to resume talks toward the SAA (Scott Lindlaw 27 April 2002; Aleksandra
Nenadovic 2 June 2006).
In 2006, in an effort to obtain the SAA, there appears to be
sincere efforts by the Serbian government to capture and extradite in Mladic,
despite the lingering dangers. In January 2005, General Vladimir Lazarevic,
indicted for crimes in Kosovo in 1999, stated the decision to turn himself in
was the only patriotic decision and "that of serving my homeland to the end."
The Serbian government has made requests to the European Union, including the
German government security services, for help in locating and catching Mladic
(Aleksandar Mitic January 2005; Nebojsa Djuric 22 June 2006; Lucia Kubosova 26
June 2006).
After the Serbian government failed meeting a deadline data for
the capture of Mladic, the Serbian public was outraged. In fact, the Serbian
public was so outraged that it demanded that Prime Minister Kostunica resign
for failing to capture Mladic. In early May 2006, thousands of people took to
the streets in Belgrade, along with a Liberal Democrat party member who stated
that "there won't be a European Serbia until we truly defeat all those who make
us look like Nazis" (qtd. in Jovana Gec 9 May 2006). The Serbian people, in its
popular opinion, appear to now be pointed toward a vision of European Serbia
rather than a violent "greater Serbia" (Jovana Gec. 9 May 2006; B92 5 May
2006).
However, some of the efforts to place pressure on Serbia to
surrender war criminals, especially Mladic, may be efforts that are too far,
too fast. It is said that in January 2004, objections to the ICTY can be heard
in Belgrade and the indictments of four army generals for actions in Kosovo in
1999 might be part of the reason why pro-Milosevic, extremist elements made the
December 2003 elections. The Radical Party, which is allied with Milosevic,
took almost one-third of the vote in parliamentary elections. The Radical Party
was lead by Vojislav Seselj, who was in The Hague for war crimes. The Radical
Party espouses the "greater Serbia" fantasy that lead to the Balkans' most
violent days. An observer at Human Rights Watch has remarked that militant
nationalism in Serbia "has never really gone away." The presence of indicted
war criminals on the ballot was considered by some Serbian reformers as "an
insult to our neighbors." In the wake of the 2006 rebuke of Serbia by Brussels,
it is said that the militant nationalists are again gaining ground in Serbian
politics (B92 5 May 2006; Aleksandra Nenadovic 7 July 2006, B92 13 June
2006).
While some say that lack of political will to face up to the
Serbian dark past may be to blame, the other reason could be the notion of an
"EU losers' club." The feeling in Serbia and other Balkan nations is that EU
membership is too far off, so pro-European parties lack credibility. As a
result of the perception, radical parties in other Balkan nations also made
election gains in 2004. However, the reformer parties were divided, chiefly
over personal agenda and in-fighting and there was a real danger that a second
election would sweep the pro-Milosevic, Radical Party back into power (Peter
Ford 30 December 2003; Julia Geshakova, 8 January 2004).
The Serbian government realizes that the Mladic stumbling block
will not be an issue that can be negated or ignored by the European Union. It
is the wish of the European Union, as well as the Kostunica government, that
there is a future place in Europe for Serbia. At the same time pro-Europe
President of Serbia, Boris Tadic, congratulated Montenegro for its independence
vote, but the reaction from Prime Minister Kostunica was "objection." The
reaction of the Serbian government was that "we have a difficult problem,
cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal and that "pressures and
conditioning&ldots;by putting the whole country into a hostage" (EUbusiness
6 June 2006; Lucia Kubosova June 26 2006).
Some of Serbia leaders still believe that the staunch demand
for Mladic prior to the SAA and the stoppage of further integration is
counterproductive. In an article from the June 26th 2006 EUobserver, Serbia's
prime minister Vojislav Kostunica voiced his frustration that the European
Union had "a policy of constant setting conditions" that was "deeply wrong and
counterproductive." The reply from Olli Rehn was that Serbia was just blaming
Brussels for its failures. Rehn was also "grateful that Prime Minister
Kostunica stopped short of putting responsibility on the EU" for Serbia's loss
to Argentina in the 2006 World Cup (qtd. in Lucia Kubosova June 26 2006).
Conclusions and Policy Implications. The line that the
European Union and the international community are walking in Serbia is a fine
line of national identity and creating a more pro-European identity. This line
is being walked by those pro-European reform elements in Serbia that can be
truly dangerous, as demonstrated in the March 2003 assassination of Zoran
Djindjic. There are elements of Serbia's past that persist in Serbian
government, including in the era of Kostunica. The fine line between Serbia's
return to militant nationalism is not stoked only by those police that remain
loyal to the dark past, but by actions that are external, especially from the
ICTY and lack of movement toward further European integration. The
Europeanization of Serbia has been effective, but the halting of further
Europeanization over the Mladic case can only serve to set back Serbia and
empower Serbian militant-nationalists. The idea of national identity and
international community reaction and demands on Serbia in the context of
Serbian culture and political landscape are something that appeared from the
documents and newspaper accounts to have never been considered.
Serbian leaders should not be expected to throw out the
remaining elements of past national identity that is linked to the brutal
nationalism that gave rise to figures like Slobodan Milosevic and General
Mladic. In reality, associating Serbia ever closer to European structure could
actually have had the effect of isolating General Mladic. In the end, keeping
Serbia outside of Europe and not opening up Serbia's border to Europe may, in
fact, keep Mladic out of The Hague and out of reach so as long as Serbia
remains out of Europe. Further integration of Serbia into European structures
can help drive the Milosevic-era, militant nationalists out of the national
political culture. Keeping Serbia out of Europe for want of Mladic, along with
any future show trial of Mladic, will only serve to empower Milosevic-era
nationalists of the Radical Party.
Prime Minister Kostunica is correct in stating that the staunch
demands by the European Union for General Mladic are counterproductive. These
demands are also dangerous for Kostunica and European Serbia, and Europe should
back off of such demands. A lesson for the European Union for the future is to
choose your association conditions more carefully - especially in the context
of "to start with" national political culture and identity - and any SAA with
Serbia is not acquis communautaire. It is clear that Kostunica's moderate
nationalism in the context of Serbian political and social culture was the
right and safe response to move Serbia closer to Europe.
Kostunica, especially slain Prime Minister Zoran
Djindjic, have brought the majority of Serbians to the desire for a European
Serbia. The acceleration of reforms against persistent Serbian militant
nationalism proved fatal to Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. In this context,
there appears to be more work that is needed - and patience - as European
Serbia will require consideration of national political and social culture.
Europeanization of Serbia should include cooperation with the ICTY and coming
to grips with and acknowledging of Serbia's dark past of militant nationalism,
but that must be part of another future.
However, the halting of further integration of Serbia into
European structures now can be harmful to reformers that need the support from
Brussels to in turn keep their public support. Otherwise, the Radical Party and
militant nationalism will once again look like an attractive alternative. Those
Serbians that are working for European Serbia are risking their lives, and this
should be recognized by Europe and the West. The European Union and the
international community should realize that the change of national identity
takes time and is a two-way effort. It must be realized that pressure from the
ICTY can cause the Serbian militant nationalism to the surface, thereby setting
back reforms, and the only one that wins this situation is General Mladic and
the militant-nationalists. Therefore, it should be recommended that the
political arm-twisting with regard to Mladic should have been avoided.
If and when Mladic is captured, there actually should be an
avoidance of a "show trial." The trial of Radko Mladic should be kept out of
the spotlight. Also, the capture of Mladic should result in immediate rewards
for Serbia from the international community, especially from the European
Union. The capture and trial of Mladic must have some tangible benefits right
away for the average Serbian and not result in a national humiliation.
Otherwise, the militant nationalist needle in Serbian culture just might point
upwards again. So, the international community must deal with and consider the
toxic residue of militant nationalism as a permanent feature of Balkan culture
as a whole. A further lesson for Europe is that some demands are best not made,
such as the turning over of indicted war criminals. As long as Serbia remains
out of Europe - safe in hiding is General Mladic - and a show trial of Mladic
would do more harm for European Serbia and more good for the Serbia's militant
nationalists' corps. There appears to be several "critical junctures" for
Serbia to redefine its national identity (either pro-Europe or anti-Europe) and
these include elections, reaction of the European Union (including rejections)
and actions of the ICTY. A show trial of Mladic in The Hague could send
Serbians to the waiting arms of the anti-Europe Radical Party and militant
nationalism again will dominate Serbia.
There are further implications for the consideration of
national identity and how the practice of Europeanization can challenge and
change national identity. What is required by those seeking to alter national
identity toward a desired outcome is a careful study of the target nation's
political and cultural context, and the willingness to work within that
nation's "as is" political and cultural context. The work to change the
national identity of a nation is currently in use and can be a good tool in
integrating nations into the global landscape.
So far, the willingness to work with Serbia's pro-Europe,
democrats is the reason why Europe is winning in the Balkans; For all of the
military efforts in the Balkans that were aimed chiefly the Milosevic regime,
including NATO's 78 day military action against Serbia in Spring 1999, it is
the European Union and the carrot of eventual membership for especially Serbia
that is winning the peace in the Balkans. The typical response on the part of
American foreign policy makers is that "Europe's lack of military capabilities
was the reason for the continued violence in the Balkans." The reality is, in
the bitter end, that the so-called "lack of military capacities on the part of
the Europeans" have nothing whatsoever to do with Serbia's association and
integration into Europe. In the end - it is the European Union that is getting
the victory in the Balkans' conflicts, but it must work within the given
Serbian cultural context to insure total victory.
The story continues...