

## **The building of European Serbia: How the European Union is winning in the Balkans**

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**Introduction.** The Balkans conflicts saw some of the most sadistic ethnic violence in Europe in 50 plus years. According to Rozen (2001), the nationalism and ethnic strife followed from the economic hard-times that were stirred on by globalization and the negative effects on political and social cohesion. The conditions gave rise to murderous nationalists, like Slobodan Milosevic and leaders like Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, who were eventually indicted for war crimes in the Balkans Conflicts. The failure of the UN in the Balkans' conflict was a let down for those who saw it as a foundation for global cooperation. The failure of international organizations eventually brought the United States and NATO into the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs after the "CNN effect" and the massacre at Srebrenica of Bosnian men and boys (Rozen 2001).

Rozen argues at the end of her essay that the hope for closure in the horrific chapter of the Balkans' conflict is "Europeanization" of the region. Europeanization and the prospect of joining Europe is a powerful new tool that had a positive effect on Serbia-Montenegro, among the other Eastern European nations. The prospect of association and relationship with Europe is proving to be a powerful, non-military tool of both security

and integration. Before the October 2000 election that drove Slobodan Milosevic out of power, Yugoslavia's and Serbia's democratic reformers have dreamed of European Serbia. The idea of European integration as a means of obtaining security includes a Europe "without holes."

This development of using non-military means in European foreign policy has been described in the Solana Paper, or the European Security Strategy. The Union also views non-military crisis management as essential to resolving a conflict by more efficient means. The means and method by which the Europeans fulfill their security goals involves mainly non-military means and by what Mark Leonard calls "passive aggression" and non-military "preventative engagement." This involves with prospective members, like Serbia, the "setting of conditions" for constructive engagement (Leonard 2004). The setting of conditions in relations between the European Union and Serbia through the prospect of *ever closer* associations leads to a reformulation of national identity, which is viewed as preconditions for "a more secure Europe and a better world" and a future European Serbia.

**Theoretical Prospective.** This paper uses social constructivist theoretical framework from European integration and political cooperation, in contrast to the realism-rational choice perspective. Realist-rational choice assumptions about European cooperation embrace the nation-state unit and the interests of single European member states, which will usually block integration in areas of foreign and security policy. According to realists, national actors come to intuitions to shape them to their national policy preferences. To the social constructivists, national preferences are shaped by actors whose preferences are *first* being shaped by the institutions in which the actors

interact. The institutions are understood to consist of formal and informal norms and expected, socially constructed rules of appropriate behavior in the institutional setting. It is the social constructivist view is that the European Union is re-shaping the national identities and preferences rather than the European Union shaped by national actors for national interests (Glarbo 2001; Pollack 2005; Checkel 2001).

National identities and key leaders are also molded in response to interaction with regional institutions. According to Checkel (2005) interaction involves the changing of attitudes and persuasion about cause and effect without threats or covert action. Checkel further argues that rational choice scholarship often emphasizes the strategic and manipulative persuasion rather than persuasion to change people's minds and act as an engine of socialization. Socialization can only occur if the identity construction is both consensual and internalized, and therefore, become imbedded in a national political culture (Checkel 2001, 2005; Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin, et al. 2001).

The work on the national identity construction of "Europe" and what is "European" in the political order is highlighted in work by Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin, et al (2001). There are three factors that will give a better understanding of national identity is acquired in relation to "Europe." The first is the new vision of political order must resonate within the existing political order and national culture. Ole Weaver (1998) also advances the idea that "Europe" must make sense within the national political culture and fit within the rules of domestic discourse.

Second, the political leaders must chose those ideas that are of their interests and at a "critical juncture" when national identity is contested and challenged in political

discourses. What Marcussen, Risse and Engelmann-Martin et al, define as a “critical juncture,” and is important in this study of Serbia-Montenegro journey toward “Europe,” is that national identity construction is most open to change in situations that are perceived as crisis situations and policy failures, including external events. Crisis events in the history have challenged national identities, such as the Nazi experience for German national identity in the aftermath of World War Two (Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin, et al: 2001).

Finally, the third factor suggested by Marcussen, Risse and Engelmann-Martin, et al, is the national identity that emerges resonates among the political majority, is internalized and institutionalized and then becomes resistant to change. Connie Robinson (2003) writes that a new national identity must be a compromise in the current political and social context that allows unity among diverse groups until the new political and social tradition can take hold. Ole Waever argues that the idea of “Europe” is not seen to replace the nation-state, but as an additional layer of national identity. European identity is phrased as political identity that does not replace the ethno-cultural identity of nations or regions.

An additional argument from Ole Waever is the concept of “Europe” as a struggle between integration and fragmentation. Integration is viewed as necessary for the security rhetoric of “Europe” as the alternative is fragmentation, which is viewed as the possible destruction of “Europe.” So, security follows with European integration and Europeanization is a prerequisite for integration into Europe. This is outlined in the EU’s document on the Stabilization and Association process that leads to further integration into European structures (Ole Weaver 1998; European Commission 26 March 2003).

**Defining “Europeanization”** – First, it is important to develop a working definition of “Europeanization” for this paper. Definitions of “Europeanization” among scholars vary widely, but definitions stress the feature of governance that characterize the European Union that are exported beyond European borders. Most definitions assess the impact of Europeanization on non-European Union member that sought closer relationship with the Union for the purpose of eventual membership. Generally, Europeanization is defined as “European rules, mechanisms and collective understandings that interact with national, domestic standards” (Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci and Bruno Coppieters, et al. 2004).

The Stabilization and Association process is viewed by the European Commission as “an agenda for the countries to reform and adapt European values and norms.” Conditionality is coupled with various types of support, but progress is dependent upon the political will of the nation to integrate into EU structures. The EU also values popular support of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) and popular understanding and visibility of the integration process” (European Commission March 26 2003: 5).

The first task to gauge Europeanization in the form of national compliance with European Union Stabilization and Association standards is to locate EU official statements, agreements, action plans and partnership documents that demonstrate the relationship between the European Union and the prospective member. To get the most out of process tracing methodology, according to Checkel (2005) involves much time and data, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

To view process trace the Europeanization of Serbia-Montenegro, the ability to gauge the modification of behavior and governmental actions of the official and leaders of Serbia-Montenegro to requirements and standards of European Union association need to be viewed. These behavior changes that are evidence of Europeanization can be viewed through two ways. The first are the official reports and papers on European policy compliance put out by European Union structures that monitor Serbia-Montenegro State Union progress toward required European goals. The second is to view the speeches and actions of government officials through newspaper accounts, which includes the statements from government officials.

The purpose of this paper is to chart Serbia's progress toward European integration using the social constructivist theoretical framework and to make policy recommendations. It is a first study paper that has a focus on the post-Milosevic drive by the Kostunica government to integrate into European structures and the superficial changes in Serbian national identity and policies in response to European demands. The study of every aspect and definition of "European values and norms" is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper has a few limitations in a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of European integration involving Kosovo, as well as Serbia-Montenegro culture, and these are well beyond the scope of this paper. This focus is on progress toward changing Yugoslavia/Serbia-Montenegro/Serbia's national identity from the past under Slobodan Milosevic to orienting Serbia's national behavior toward European standards.

Also viewed by this paper are the lingering effects of Serbian militant nationalism on integrating Serbia into European structures. The intended result is to integrate Serbia-

Montenegro (Serbia and Montenegro) into European structures – and this provides for a more secure Europe.

**How the European Union helped beat the Milosevic regime.** Prior to the October 2000 elections, European Union foreign ministers held out the prospect of closer association and the lifting of sanctions. As hope to Serbia’s democratic opposition the European Union issued this statement:

“On 24 September, the people of Serbia will be faced with a critical choice. The elections give the Serbian people the possibility of repudiating clearly and peacefully Milosevic’s policies, which consist of political manipulation, the deprivation of freedom, impoverishment” (qtd. in Joyon Naegle, 19 September 2000).

At a pre-election rally of 25,000 supporters in Nis, the opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, declared that upon election he would work to “return the country to the European fold”. At a rally in April 2000, attended by 100,000 people, Kostunica rebuked NATO’s actions against his country a year earlier and stated that he “found it hard to believe that people are killed, exhausted and starved by sanctions...for their own benefit.” Despite the denunciations of the West at this rally, the political platform of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) included pro-European statements about European Serbia. The democratic opposition sought to reorganize Serbia and normalize relations with other nations, to include integration into European structures and to join the Council of Europe. Law and order and the fight against crime, openness and an independent courts system were also top goals of the democratic opposition (BDnet News 14 April 2000; Associated Press 14 April 2000; BDnet News 3 March 2000).

The democratic opposition to Milosevic regime had asked for the October 2000 revolution at the ballot box that was aided by the European Union. Between November

1999 and Spring 2000, the EU gave fuel oil to seven Serbian cities that were governed by the democratic opposition, despite Milosevic's attempts to block EU aid.

By at least the Spring of 2000, the EU gave aid to the harassed, democratic opposition after the Milosevic regime attempted to stop meetings and arrested students and journalists. Some of the actions on the part of the Milosevic regime included beating of people gathering for rallies. *Otpor* activists were beaten and tortured and held for charges of "terrorism." People were indicted for "spreading for false information." In the middle of this, the European Union stated that it "supports the legitimate struggle of Serbian people for freedom and democracy." After the defeat of Milosevic, in November 2000, the European Union pledged 2.5 billion euros over five years. The final rejection of Milosevic occurred in late December of 2000 and Zoran Djindjic promised a full recovery and a full investigation of Milosevic much to the delight of the European Union (BDNet News 10 May 2000; Human Rights Watch 2001; BDNet News 25 November 2000; Cable News Network 25 December 2000).

The conclusions of the Thessaloniki Council of June 2003 stopped short of promising membership for the Western Balkans, but did promise, "directing the reform efforts of the Western Balkan countries in coming closer to the Union" (Council of the European Union 20 June 2003: 13). Support for a regional approach to security that is focused on the Western Balkans was also echoed at the Thessaloniki Council with regard external relations and security policy aimed at "guaranteeing a secure Europe and a better world". The promotion of conflict prevention through regional cooperation, reflected at Thessaloniki, is also a theme of the European Security Strategy of December 2003 (Council of the European Union 20 June 2003).

A main objective of Serbia-Montenegro government under Vojislav Kostunica has been European integration. The European Union has provided policy advice to Serbia-Montenegro since 2001 in the form of the EU-FRY Consultive Task Force (CTF). The CTF was replaced by the Enhance Permanent Dialogue, which monitors and drives reforms of the European Partnership adapted by the Council of Ministers and the corresponding implementation plan of December 2004 (Council of the European Union 20 June 2003).

The process of bringing Serbia- Montenegro closer to Europe is to result, eventually, in a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which is viewed as a process toward eventual European Union membership. The European Partnership of June 2004 sets out requirements for European Union compatibility in all areas of governance for both Serbia *and* Montenegro, including Kosovo. Beside EU compatibility there are the requirements of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the UNSCR 1244 for Kosovo. The first European Partnership of 2004 was replaced with the European Partnership of 30 January 2006 and is intended to commit Serbia-Montenegro to an even deeper relationship with Europe. The second European Partnership has a large dose of Justice and Home Affairs, especially with regard to Kosovo (Official Journal of the European Union 2 July 2006).

A report from the European Commission (EC) from March 2003 describes the SAAs as a prospect for nations to reform and adapt European values and norms. The same 2003 report chided Serbia-Montenegro's political leaders for "much to be desired behavior," such as confrontational approaches, personal agendas, obstruction and corruption, and the EC cited low voter turnout in elections as loss of public confidence in

the political system (European Commission 26 March 2003; European Commission. 12 April 2005 ).

The report on Serbia's progress toward the SAA negotiations from April 2005 stated that Serbia had made significant progress in meeting its obligations in regard to the cooperation with the ICTY, including improvement in access to documents and witnesses. Also, human and minority rights had also improved, along with improvements in respect for the freedom of speech. The European Commission declared that Serbia was in a position to assume the obligation resulting from an SSA in the area of the movement of workers, capital, services and goods. Despite the need for further improvements the European Commission declared that Serbia was ready for an SSA in April 2005 (European Commission 12 April 2005).

**The work toward European Serbia.** In a 21 September 2001 paper put out by the International Crisis Group chided the administration of President Vojislav Kostunica for nationalism and neglecting need political, judicial and social reforms. The ICG paper accuses Kostunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of conservative nationalism that was "preserving certain elements of the Milosevic legacy" (International Crisis Group 2001:11). The accusations against the Kostunica Government are that it employs leftovers from the Milosevic era, dodges cooperation with the ICTY, and holds tacit supports for the "greater Serbia" fantasy. The DSS, along with the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), the main party opposing the Milosevic regime, were united against Milosevic's attempts to obstruct election results and were in agreement to extradite Milosevic to The Hague prior to formation of the Republican government in December 2000 (European Commission 12 April 2005; International Crisis Group 2001).

The ICG paper describes Kostunica and his DSS party as the most popular, due to Kostunica's personal standing. At the time the ICG paper was written, there was a perception on the part of DOS leader and then Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic that pushing forward economic and social reforms could cause turmoil. The Serbian government avoided educating the public on the reforms that were being instated for pro-European standards. The popularity of the Kostunica government was used by pro-Western reformer Djindjic to push difficult reforms and transition measures. For his part, Kostunica did not use his office to block reform, but he did not come out in clear support for reforms. The one that was accused of "clinging to Serbia's past" was Serbia's president Kostunica, who often feuded with the pro-West, reform-minded Zoran Djindjic. The Kostunica government was reluctant to challenge the passive and broad backing (at that time) for Serbian nationalism and the Republika Srpska (International Crisis Group, 21 September 2001; Dusan Stojanovic 22 March 2002).

Djindjic would subsequently be the victim of assassination on 12 March 2003, and this tragic event would be another changing crisis for Serbia. However, the reaction to the murder of pro-Europe, pro-West reformer PM Djindjic by elements of the past Milosevic regime was a reminder that elements from Serbia's dark past were involved in police services and organized crime, along with the need to reform the ailing judiciary which threatened the rule of law in the country. The European Commission reports commend the memory of Djindjic drive to build democracy and bring Serbia out of international isolation. Djindjic was the victim of those militant national that still long for the murderous Milosevic days and want to halt the work toward European Serbia. (European Commission, 26 March 2003; European Commission, 2004; European

Commission 12 April 2005). The Commission pledged its full support behind those are fighting and resisting the elements of Serbia's past that were behind the murder of Djindjic and seek to destroy Serbian democracy.

**The requirement for ICTY cooperation and Serbian militant nationalism as a stumbling block.** After the October 2000 elections Kostunica acknowledged that Milosevic was "one of those responsible" for atrocities in Bosnia and Croatia. While stating that Serbs were also killed, the newly elected Yugoslav president also stated "I am ready to accept guilt for all those people that have been killed." In another interview with a Macedonian television Kostunica stated, "any cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague in the case of Milosevic will destabilize the situation in Yugoslavia." In an interview, Kostunica dismissed the ICTY as a "tool of U.S. foreign policy" (Joyon Naegle 25 October 2000.).

The major stumbling block keeping Serbia locked out of further European integration through the SAA process is the full cooperation with the ICTY and especially the arrest of General Ratko Mladic. In late April of 2002, President Bush sent a letter to Yugoslavian Government encouraging full cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and that Serbia's entrance into NATO's Partnership for Peace program depended upon full cooperation with the ICTY. The question of the surrender of indicted General Mladic is now the only obstacle holding Serbia from the SAA and further European integration. After Montenegro voted in 2006 for independence, EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solana made clear the European demand for the surrender of Mladic is an absolute condition to resume talks toward the SAA (Scott Lindlaw 27 April 2002; Aleksandra Nenadovic 2 June 2006).

In 2006, in an effort to obtain the SAA, there appears to be sincere efforts by the Serbian government to capture and extradite in Mladic, despite the lingering dangers. In January 2005, General Vladimir Lazarevic, indicted for crimes in Kosovo in 1999, stated the decision to turn himself in was the only patriotic decision and “that of serving my homeland to the end.” The Serbian government has made requests to the European Union, including the German government security services, for help in locating and catching Mladic (Aleksandar Mitic January 2005; Nebojsa Djuric 22 June 2006; Lucia Kubosova 26 June 2006).

After the Serbian government failed meeting a deadline data for the capture of Mladic, the Serbian public was outraged. In fact, the Serbian public was so outraged that it demanded that Prime Minister Kostunica resign for failing to capture Mladic. In early May 2006, thousands of people took to the streets in Belgrade, along with a Liberal Democrat party member who stated that “there won’t be a European Serbia until we truly defeat all those who make us look like Nazis” (qtd. in Jovana Gec 9 May 2006). The Serbian people, in its popular opinion, appear to now be pointed toward a vision of European Serbia rather than a violent “greater Serbia” (Jovana Gec. 9 May 2006; B92 5 May 2006).

However, some of the efforts to place pressure on Serbia to surrender war criminals, especially Mladic, may be efforts that are too far, too fast. It is said that in January 2004, objections to the ICTY can be heard in Belgrade and the indictments of four army generals for actions in Kosovo in 1999 might be part of the reason why pro-Milosevic, extremist elements made the December 2003 elections. The Radical Party, which is allied with Milosevic, took almost one-third of the vote in parliamentary

elections. The Radical Party was lead by Vojislav Seselj, who was in The Hague for war crimes. The Radical Party espouses the “greater Serbia” fantasy that lead to the Balkans’ most violent days. An observer at Human Rights Watch has remarked that militant nationalism in Serbia “has never really gone away.” The presence of indicted war criminals on the ballot was considered by some Serbian reformers as “an insult to our neighbors.” In the wake of the 2006 rebuke of Serbia by Brussels, it is said that the militant nationalists are again gaining ground in Serbian politics (B92 5 May 2006; Aleksandra Nenadovic 7 July 2006, B92 13 June 2006).

While some say that lack of political will to face up to the Serbian dark past may be to blame, the other reason could be the notion of an “EU losers’ club.” The feeling in Serbia and other Balkan nations is that EU membership is too far off, so pro-European parties lack credibility. As a result of the perception, radical parties in other Balkan nations also made election gains in 2004. However, the reformer parties were divided, chiefly over personal agenda and in-fighting and there was a real danger that a second election would sweep the pro-Milosevic, Radical Party back into power (Peter Ford 30 December 2003; Julia Geshakova, 8 January 2004).

The Serbian government realizes that the Mladic stumbling block will not be an issue that can be negated or ignored by the European Union. It is the wish of the European Union, as well as the Kostunica government, that there is a future place in Europe for Serbia. At the same time pro-Europe President of Serbia, Boris Tadic, congratulated Montenegro for its independence vote, but the reaction from Prime Minister Kostunica was “objection.” The reaction of the Serbian government was that “we have a difficult problem, cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal and that

“pressures and conditioning...by putting the whole country into a hostage” (EUbusiness 6 June 2006; Lucia Kubosova June 26 2006).

Some of Serbia leaders still believe that the staunch demand for Mladic prior to the SAA and the stoppage of further integration is counterproductive. In an article from the June 26<sup>th</sup> 2006 *EUobserver*, Serbia’s prime minister Vojislav Kostunica voiced his frustration that the European Union had “a policy of constant setting conditions” that was “deeply wrong and counterproductive.” The reply from Olli Rehn was that Serbia was just blaming Brussels for its failures. Rehn was also “grateful that Prime Minister Kostunica stopped short of putting responsibility on the EU” for Serbia’s loss to Argentina in the 2006 World Cup (qtd. in Lucia Kubosova June 26 2006).

**Conclusions and Policy Implications.** The line that the European Union and the international community are walking in Serbia is a fine line of national identity and creating a more pro-European identity. This line is being walked by those pro-European reform elements in Serbia that can be truly dangerous, as demonstrated in the March 2003 assassination of Zoran Djindjic. There are elements of Serbia’s past that persist in Serbian government, including in the era of Kostunica. The fine line between Serbia’s return to militant nationalism is not stoked only by those police that remain loyal to the dark past, but by actions that are external, especially from the ICTY and lack of movement toward further European integration. The Europeanization of Serbia has been effective, but the halting of further Europeanization over the Mladic case can only serve to set back Serbia and empower Serbian militant-nationalists. The idea of national identity and international community reaction and demands on Serbia in the context of

Serbian culture and political landscape are something that appeared from the documents and newspaper accounts to have never been considered.

Serbian leaders should not be expected to throw out the remaining elements of past national identity that is linked to the brutal nationalism that gave rise to figures like Slobodan Milosevic and General Mladic. In reality, associating Serbia ever closer to European structure could actually have had the effect of isolating General Mladic. In the end, keeping Serbia outside of Europe and not opening up Serbia's border to Europe may, in fact, keep Mladic out of The Hague and out of reach so as long as Serbia remains out of Europe. Further integration of Serbia into European structures can help drive the Milosevic-era, militant nationalists out of the national political culture. Keeping Serbia out of Europe for want of Mladic, along with any future show trial of Mladic, will only serve to empower Milosevic-era nationalists of the Radical Party.

Prime Minister Kostunica is correct in stating that the staunch demands by the European Union for General Mladic are counterproductive. These demands are also dangerous for Kostunica and European Serbia, and Europe should back off of such demands. A lesson for the European Union for the future is to *choose your association conditions more carefully* - especially in the context of "to start with" national political culture and identity – and any SAA with Serbia is not *acquis communautaire*. It is clear that Kostunica's moderate nationalism in the context of Serbian political and social culture was the right and safe response to move Serbia closer to Europe.

Kostunica, especially slain Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, have brought the majority of Serbians to the desire for a European Serbia. The acceleration of reforms against persistent Serbian militant nationalism proved fatal to Prime Minister Zoran

Djindjic. In this context, there appears to be more work that is needed – and patience – as European Serbia will require consideration of national political and social culture.

Europeanization of Serbia should include cooperation with the ICTY and coming to grips with and acknowledging of Serbia's dark past of militant nationalism, but that must be part of another future.

However, the halting of further integration of Serbia into European structures now can be harmful to reformers that need the support from Brussels to in turn keep their public support. Otherwise, the Radical Party and militant nationalism will once again look like an attractive alternative. Those Serbians that are working for European Serbia are risking their lives, and this should be recognized by Europe and the West. The European Union and the international community should realize that the change of national identity takes time and is a two-way effort. It must be realized that pressure from the ICTY can cause the Serbian militant nationalism to the surface, thereby setting back reforms, and the only one that wins this situation is General Mladic and the militant-nationalists. Therefore, it should be recommended that the political arm-twisting with regard to Mladic should have been avoided.

If and when Mladic is captured, there actually should be an avoidance of a “show trial.” The trial of Radko Mladic should be kept out of the spotlight. Also, the capture of Mladic should result in immediate rewards for Serbia from the international community, especially from the European Union. The capture and trial of Mladic must have some tangible benefits right away for the average Serbian and not result in a national humiliation. Otherwise, the militant nationalist needle in Serbian culture just might point upwards again. So, the international community must deal with and consider the toxic

residue of militant nationalism as a permanent feature of Balkan culture as a whole. A further lesson for Europe is that some demands are best not made, such as the turning over of indicted war criminals. As long as Serbia remains out of Europe – safe in hiding is General Mladic – and a show trial of Mladic would do more harm for European Serbia and more good for the Serbia's militant nationalists' corps. There appears to be several "critical junctures" for Serbia to redefine its national identity (either pro-Europe or anti-Europe) and these include elections, reaction of the European Union (including rejections) and actions of the ICTY. A show trial of Mladic in The Hague could send Serbians to the waiting arms of the anti-Europe Radical Party and militant nationalism again will dominate Serbia.

There are further implications for the consideration of national identity and how the practice of Europeanization can challenge and change national identity. What is required by those seeking to alter national identity toward a desired outcome is a careful study of the target nation's political and cultural context, and the willingness to work within that nation's "as is" political and cultural context. The work to change the national identity of a nation is currently in use and can be a good tool in integrating nations into the global landscape.

So far, the willingness to work with Serbia's pro-Europe, democrats is the reason why Europe is winning in the Balkans...For all of the military efforts in the Balkans that were aimed chiefly the Milosevic regime, including NATO's 78 day military action against Serbia in Spring 1999, it is the European Union and the carrot of eventual membership for especially Serbia that is winning the peace in the Balkans. The typical response on the part of American foreign policy makers is that "Europe's lack of military

capabilities was the reason for the continued violence in the Balkans.” The reality is, in the bitter end, that the so-called “lack of military capacities on the part of the Europeans” have nothing whatsoever to do with Serbia’s association and integration into Europe. In the end – it is the European Union that is getting the victory in the Balkans’ conflicts, but it must work within the given Serbian cultural context to insure total victory.

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