The U.S.-Russia relationship: A hopeful thaw?

ESLaPorte

6 February 2009

 

Introduction. The past year of 2008 was probably the lowest for U.S.-Russian relations since the end of Soviet communism. Russia reacted strongly when the Serbian province of Kosovo declared independence, to the loud protest of Russia's South Slav allies, the Serbs. There was the inking of the missile defense shield deal between Poland and the Czech Republic. In early August, Russia responded to what it said was an offensive attack by Georgia on South Ossetia, which soured U.S. - Russian relations to the lowest since the Cold War. Russia has accused the U.S. and the West of not ignoring it and not taking its opinions into account, especially in Russia's backyard.

While the new Obama administration and some members of Congress have sounded warm about the prospect of a renewal of U.S.-Russia relations, the Russians are sometimes difficult to work with. Part of the difficulty stems from the Russian identity that is shaped by the past, must be understood, along with the desire of "Westernizers" to bring Russia closer to the West. While trying to retrieve what Defense Secretary, Robert Gates calls "missed opportunities," there must be some consideration of Russian past, which shapes the country's current identity. The issue that is of most current concern of both Russia and the United States is confronting Iran on its nuclear enrichment program. Other issues include international terrorism, non-proliferation, and especially the Afghanistan security situation, which Russia supports the NATO presence there. The question is how can the U.S.-Russia policy be brought out of the freezer, while anticipating and coping with "Russian sensibilities," and building a better relationship to meet challenges that are of mutual interest to both nations?

Russian identity and foreign policy. The emergence of New Thinking in the Soviet Union, according to Robert Herman's study of Soviet-Russian identity, was the result of specialist-expert networks that provided the bridge between the new ideas and identities and the political leadership. The framing of Soviet national interests was a political struggle between the competing groups within the political elite. The conception of idealist thinking into Soviet policy late in the term of Gorbachev were in-system reformers who believed in principles that governed Western democracies and policies (1996; 285, 283).

 A few authors argue that post-Soviet Russia has wanted to integrate with the West, especially a "return to Europe." These ideas were subscribed to by the Foreign Ministry, as well as foreign policy intellectuals of the Soviet era. In fact, Angela Stent (2007) argues that in the post-USSR looked for Western help to recreate itself after having renounced its communist identity and system. Some Westernizers believe that Russia should draw closer to NATO and even join the Alliance (417, 419). These ideas were subscribed to by the Foreign Ministry, as well as foreign policy intellectuals of the Soviet era. There are also the "statists," which include Vladimir Putin, who envision Russia as a great power on the world stage. This vision of Russia's place is one of a "great power" in the world and the "exceptional Russia" (Tsygankov 2006; 66, 158).

The Russian national interests that are relevant today are shaped by its past as an empire and under occupations. The Tatar occupation, the "Mongol yoke" of the late 1400s, is described by M.K. Dziewanowski (2003) as the most single event that shaped Russian (Muscovite) political, social and relations to other ethnic groups, which, under Mongol rule, were all subject to the Tatar ruler. After the fall of the Tatars, the Muscovite rulers continued to follow the same examples. Under the rule of Empirical Russia, there followed a policy of Russification where Russian administrators were installed in the Baltic nations, Poland and Finland (17, 18, 44).

Igor Torbakov (2008) argues the fact that Russia used to be an empire for much of its history should not be underestimated or over emphasized enough. The nature of the Russian land-based empire was to make its frontiers secure and making buffer zones to make itself secure. Although the Russia of today is no longer an empire, there are some in Moscow today that have nostalgia for the old empire, however, most of Russia's policy elites do not envision the old empire, but do see the zone of ex-Soviet republics as vital to their economic security interests (3).

Andrei Tsygankov (2006) writes that Russian foreign policy kept the West as the center of its policy. Tsygankov writes that Putin viewed the September 11 attacks as an opportunity to bring about his new vision of national interests that were framed according to Western values and commitments. Part of the rationale was that Russia was fighting its own war against terrorism and found common cause with the United States. Putin had made past efforts to organize counter-terrorism efforts with Western nations, despite the skepticism of the Russian domestic public. After the terrorist attacks on America, Putin offered the Americans intelligence sharing, open Russian airspace, and rallying Asian nations to the American cause against the Afghanistan Taliban (138-39).

Igor Torbakov (2008) writes that Russia's main interest in Central Asia is maintaining stability and maintaining local governments against Islamic fundamentalism. The "color revolutions" in the former Soviet satellites are often explained as "Western inspired revolts intended to undermine those governments that are loyal to the Kremlin." Part of the Russian focus is on two regional rivals, China and the United States, and on oils and gas that provides Moscow's profitable relationship with Europe (4).

The rock bottom of US-Russia relations. This paper will focus on the past year, 2008, but will keep in mind the Bush administration's policies. The past year has been and very chilly one for US-Russia relations, chilled to the bone through the hot war between Georgia and Russia. Steven Pifer (2009) writes that the decline in U.S. Russian relations has gone downhill from a May 2002 high and the aftermath of Russian support for America's War on Terrorism (3).

This first issue of division was the move for Kosovo's independence from Serbia, which was led by the United States. The Kosovo Parliament voted on February 15, 2008 for its independence declaration, which brought reaction from Moscow, as well as Belgrade. Russia felt that its opinion and views were not being respected or even heard, by its American and European partners. In the wake of the declaration, Moscow hinted that independence could be gained for other inspiring regions, like South Ossetia (Ferguson 2008, 2; Pifer 2009, 4).

Moscow was apparently listening to when it come to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Russia apparently convinced France and Germany to put the brakes on membership for the two nations, which received backing for membership from Washington. However, Putin issued veiled threats to target nuclear missiles against Ukraine and stated that further NATO expansion would be viewed as a threat to Russia. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, stated that the issue of Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership was not "if," but "when" (Ferguson 2008, 2). According to Andrei Tsygankov (2006), the expansion of the NATO Alliance to Russia's borders and the feeling of loss of territory and status, along with conflicts in the Russian periphery, caused a rethinking of Westernist foreign policy course. The expansion of NATO caused Yeltsin to rethink his policy and the Westernizer Kozyrev was removed as foreign minister and the new concern with the Soviet area was re-established (63, 65).

The opening of the Beijing Olympics was also the opening of the short, but hot war between Russia and Georgia. Georgia's small army was quickly overwhelmed by Russian forces. Although the conflict was triggered by Georgian actions, the Russian image of using overwhelming force against a neighbor and re-enforced the image of a "bully resurgent Russia" and tarnished the Russian image in the West. The use of aggressive by Russia has generally backfired in the West (Patokallio 2008; 3-4). However, American public support for Tbilisi in the conflict and the unpredictable and "immature" president, Mikheil Saakashvili, on top of past advocacy for NATO membership, provided a further irritant to Moscow and already strained relations (Nixey 2008; 2-3).

In early July, about one month before Russia's war with Georgia, the deal was reached with the Czech Republic. According to Joseph Ferguson (2008) the usual inflammatory response from Moscow drove the Czechs to finally sign the establishment of the ballistic missile defense radar in their country. The deals with Poland and the Czech Republic were inked to build 10 interceptors with a 2010 operational deadline. Although the Bush administration stated that the intended target of the missile defense project is the Iranian missile threat, the impression in Moscow that that the site has Russia in mind.

What the U.S. - Russia relationship could have in common. Steven Pifer (2009) argues that much of the actions and inflammatory tones out of Russia are borne out of its frustrations with U.S, policy. Russians admire the U.S. and acknowledge the U.S. as the lone superpower. There is the perception that the U.S. does not consider Russia's views and interests, even as the United States and Russia share similar interests and even security issues, especially against terrorism that is rooted in Islamic fundamentalism (3).

Vladimir Putin was in the middle of Russia's own war against terrorism in September 2001 when the terrorist attacks in the United States occurred. Like President Bush, President Putin was engaged in a "war on terror," although the phrase was not used. In September 1999, there were bomb attacks in Moscow, and Putin promised to rid the country of the "rising evil" against Western civilization, he won the presidential election:

At the time, Moscow preferred to downplay its activity as a counterterrorist operation, not a war, while advancing grander claims about shielding Western civilization against an undefined 'rising evil.' These ambitions appeared quite absurd up until the watershed of September 11, 2001, when the standard discourse of international relations abruptly changed and Russia eagerly joined the U.S.-led global antiterrorist coalition (Baev 2006, 1).

Another area of potential cooperation could be in Afghanistan and the fight against the Taliban. Russia wanted to help after the attacks of September 11 and the country still supports the NATO mission there. Recently, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan asked for Russian aid and some help was granted by a Russia that is eager to help out.

Well, another common interest with the U.S. with regard to Iranian missile ambitions, but now, with President Obama, the U.S. may be willing to listen and enjoy a renewed partnership. For one, Senator Carl Levin stated that an Alliance could be built with Russia on the issue of Iran. "I don't think you can exaggerate the impact of that kind of a potential partnership," the Michigan senator said. The breakthrough could be to renew U.S. - Russia relations to a new cooperation on Iran, as well as terrorism. (Andrew Gray, January 30, 2009; Steve Gutterman, January 30, 2009). The senator believes that, like the U.S., an Iran with nuclear weapons and missiles is also not in Russia's interest. There could be a "united front" against Iran and religious terrorism, and involvement of Russia in Central Asian security.

In recent days the new Obama administration and Congress members have been signaling the desire to have a new and better partnership with Russia that benefits international security, as well as the interests of both countries. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates disagrees with the U.S. military establishment that "Russia is a threat." Rather than confrontation, there should be cooperation where there can be cooperation can be had, but that we should be to "push back on the Russians." Gates states that there is some level of cooperation with Russia in getting supplies to Western troops in Afghanistan. We must be prepared for what Gates calls "Russian sensibilities" that are "pretty deep seated. This includes on the issue of NATO expansion, which, if closer cooperation with Russia is indeed devolved, might not be viewed as threatening to Russia (Walter Pincus, 5 January 2009; Charlie Rose Show, February 2, 2009).

Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Richard Lugar, started that it is "high-time for Russia and the U.S. to think about partnership again" in various areas, especially in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, control of nuclear armaments and against international terrorism. The area of non-proliferation could be an area of a "common project" for Russia and the United States. American Congressmen and Russian Duma parliamentarians are always ready to cooperate on a mutually cooperative relationship (Johnson's Russia List, n.d.).

The future cooperation between the U.S. and Russia must first take into account the various sensibilities, phobias and anxieties that the Russians have. Until that level of trust can be build, there should be a stoppage in expanding the NATO Alliance. There should not only be a question about further NATO expansion, but if the Alliance is really useful in the post-Cold War age and is, in fact, getting in the way of productive relations between the U.S., Russia and Europe. A vigorous and well functioning partnership can mean confronting Iran's enrichment program and building security in Afghanistan, which Russia can play a meaningful part in the security of its "backyard." Future cooperation should also be extended to the area of missile defense and such cooperation can also be a joint project for the U.S. and Russia. While anticipating "Russian sensibilities," the goal of the Obama administration should be to build a partnership of long-term, security cooperation.

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