The Somali Pirates and the European Union: What is wrong with Operation Atalanta by European values.

ESLaPorte

16 March 2009

“I find it immoral that the European Union protects commercial vessels and the fishing vessels that benefit from the inability of the Somalis to control their natural resources and forgets that the Somalis are dying due to the anarchy in their country.”

"I am not against this mission. But it will not manage to stop piracy as long as a functioning state is lacking in Somalia. If it is just this mission and nothing else I am against."

- MEP Ana Gomes.

 

CONTENTS

Introduction - European values, ESDP missions and basis for Operation Atalanta - The failure of the United Nations’ to “get it”... - How fishermen became pirates... - The faulty Security Council resolutions and retooling Operation Atalanta mission - The responsibility for the European Union... - Notes - Selected Bibliography - Appendix-Art. 25, Nice Treaty

Introduction

When the world, including the United Nations, decided to beat up on Somali “pirates” it whipped up a frenzy of “bring the pirates to justice” and the world, including the European Union, sent warships to the call of the Security Council. However, in the frenzy of Security Council resolutions, most authored by the Bush administration, there was little concern on especially the part of the United Nations to stemming the root causes of why Somali fishermen were turning to piracy in the first place. In the frenzy, the United Nations left behind the root causes of “Somali piracy” in the loss of fishing livelihoods though illegal fishing and nuclear waste dumping in Somali waters.

The Council of the European Union's own website states that the European Union is dedicated to the peace process in Somalia, and we should commend that as it is what the European Union should be (1), but the EU NAVFOR mission, Operation Atalanta appears to be something less than European (2). Instead, the operation appears to be a cowboy-style crafted in Bush administration Security Council resolutions. Some of the Security Council resolutions that the EU naval force’s mission is based upon, chiefly 1816 and 1851, are poorly written and contain little redeeming in terms of addressing the root causes of “Somali piracy.”

There are important issues for especially European citizens. The first is the apparent inability or unwillingness of the European Union and other international organization to address the root cause of the “Somali piracy” problem, which is illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping. While the EU Council claims that it is protecting merchant ships and those carrying food aid, there is the prospect that Operation Atalanta is actually providing safe passage to foreign fishing vessels and dumpers of nuclear, toxic wastes, while deterring Somali fishermen from defending their own waters.

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European values, ESDP missions and basis for Operation Atalanta.

John McCormick (2007) argues, as other authors have, that European values are different from American values. Among those values is to seek non-military and civilian solutions to international crisis, a European values that is totally absent from the EU’s Operation Atalanta mission in the Gulf of Aden. European values include humanism, peace, and the ability to and the ability to solve conflicts by more than just military power (3). The Operation Atalanta resembles an American mission more than a European one- and once one takes a look at who authored the Security Council "mandate," it is understood why. The difference between emphasis on military power by Americans versus Europeans' conflict resolution was noted by Jeremy Rifkin (2004):

The Europeans seek security in strengthening international laws...laws governing human rights. The aim is to minimize hostilities among foes to use military intervention selectively to separate warring factions. The EU puts a high premium on conflict resolution than military victory. It uses economic assistance as a means of empowering the poor, spreading democracy and bringing troubled hotspots into the community of civilized people.

The idea is that the United States, with its superior military capabilities, uses its unchallenged dominance to act as sort of a global disciplinarian, punishing wrong-doers and evil ways. The European Union, with its conflict-resolution and peacekeeping abilities, can serve as a rehabilitor, helping wrong-doers, through a combination of peacekeeping and economic assistance, to see the error of their ways and reform their behavior (4).

As you will see in this paper, the EU’s activities in off the coast of Somali in Operation Atalanta resemble military activities by Americans, not Europeans. Americans place emphasis in military power and “wars on,” such as the “War on Terrorism.” Even shipping companies have been nagging EU Member states to have a “war on piracy.” The use of the military only to “combat” so-called “Somali pirates” is unbecoming of Europe and Europeans.

 Europeanism Americanism 

Peace

Internationalism

Multilateralism

Soft power

Civilian

Universal

Community

Future

Settled

Risk aversion

Pragmatic

 War

Nationalism

Unilateral

Hard power

Military

Provincial

Individual

Past

Restless

Risk tolerance

Utopian

Figure 1. McCormick’s comparison of Europeanism to Americanism.

The European idea of “peace” is not pacifistic or for trading military defense for disarmament, but military intervention remains a strand of European policy. For Mark Leonard (2005) the European idea of “preventative engagement” in the “European way of war” is a long term involvement, along with pre-emptive economic and legal interventions, that have the aim to building political and institutional stability – and not just simply by removing threats. Further, where European troops are deployed, it is not to defend pipelines or the balance of power, nor illegal fishing vessels, but in support of humanitarian goals. It is clear that goals for ESDP missions must not be divorced from European values (5).

The European Security Strategy (ESS) describes that security is the precondition for devolpment and that conflict and poverty can spawn criminality. State failure can lead to weak institutions and can spawn organized crime and terrorism. Under the heading of “Building Security in Our Neighborhood” - but instability can and is occurring outside of Europe’s “neighborhood” and the security document does not appear to provide a good roadmap, other than statements of “effective multilateralism” and providing a “wider spectrum” of capabilities. In its “progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management” the Union states that it is deploying both military and civilian assets, and the ESS does place more emphasis on the use of diplomacy and civilian means to respond to troubled places in the world that do the same American security documents (6).

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations (7).

According to Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006), the ESS also reveals a broader agenda for ESDP for a “wider spectrum of missions.” This “wider spectrum” includes support for third countries that are facing security threats and threats from terrorism and non-state actors. There is the possibility of intervention into a state that is either unwilling or unable to deal with threats from non-state actors. Under the “wider spectrum” is the devolpment of for ESDP missions toward rapid reaction forces of that are sustainable in the field, and this deployability was proven in the Operation Artemis, are to be used against non-state actors and even criminal groups (8).

The European Union has been building its commitment to the United Nations. It was the 2003 Operation Artemis that changed both the relationship between the both the United Nations and the African Union and the European Union. At the request of the Security Council, the EU sent largely French forces to a peace support operation in support of a UN force. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is responsible for the conduct of all EU operations, command and control, as directed in Article 25 of the Nice Treaty (9). However, the PSC does not have the power to alter or terminate a mission. The framework is usually based on an UN Security Council Resolution, includes a status of forces agreement with a host nation, and followed by Council decisions that launch the mission and appoint commanders or Head of Mission (10).

The ESDP missions in Africa have meant the European Union has been developing a relationship with the African Union, as well as developing a greater coordination of activities with the UN. According to Ademola Abass (2007) there will be an increased military participation by the European Union in the future of Africa (11). Operation Atalanta is one of those times and it also has the blessing of the African Union, as well as an ill-conceived and poorly written (and rushed) Security Council Resolution 1816, and the equally bad 1851.

The planning for what is now Operation Atalanta began in, according to the French Presidency’s ESDP report, when the Council decided to “contribute actively to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1814 and 1816” (12). Resolution 1814 is concerning the conflict and grave security situation in Somalia, including the situation for human rights and restoration of government order. However, Resolution 1816 centers around “piracy” and “armed robbery at sea” – with calls for nations to engage in the deterrence and defense of commercial vessels (13). However, these Security Council resolutions do not even mention the illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping, as “securing Somalia’s coast line” means against so-called “pirates,” not from those that seek to plunder and pollute Somalia’s natural resources.

The French Presidency ESDP states that the first “military coordination action EU NAVCO, to combat piracy and protect maritime trade” and situated within the General Secretariat of the Council. The Council Decision to launch “Atalanta” came on 8 December 2008, and nowhere in this decision is there either consideration of protecting Somalia’s coasts from illegal fishing or toxic waste dumping, only “to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast” as a follow-up- to the Council’s 10 November joint decision (14).

What is also shocking is that the “solution” to the “Somali pirates” who are “committing armed robbery on the seas” frenzy became like a mania and a collective sickness that even caught up Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The rhetoric of MEPs reveals more than that just concern about food aid and merchant vessels, but also a tactic acceptance to accept illegal fishing by vessels flying the flags of EU Member States (15). One MEP, Filip Kaczmarek (Poland EPP), wanted the Somali fishermen-turned pirates into the same as “terrorists” It appears that only Ana Gomes of Portugal who appeared to be the only MEP to point out that European Union extending protection those who plunder and pollute though its Operation Atalanta is a most immoral and troubling thing for the European Union to do.

 We must understand that at root they were simple fishermen who tried to defend their fishing zones, pillaged by foreign fishing. Of course, they subsequently understood that acts of piracy brought more rewards than fishing (16).

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The failure of the United Nations’ to “get it”...as militaristic Security Council resolutions were led by the United States - outright invasion also accepted!

To Peter Lehr, the use of naval power to “sink the pirates” is only half of the appropriate response, but tackling the illegal fishing that have led the former fishermen to piracy in the first place is a moch better response:

However, it should be pointed out that conducting anti-piracy patrols in these waters can only ever be half of the solution. The other is to protect Somali waters against illegal fishing, thus giving local fishermen a fair chance to earn a living without turning to criminality (17).

Here is where not only the European Union fails miserably by its own values, but also the United Nations has failed to “get it” when it comes to tackling the root causes of piracy. NO – sinking the former fishermen –turned pirates with European naval power is a most awful solution for Europe and is also unfair to the Somalis themselves. The observation by most of the world outside of Brussels and New York is that the piracy is a result of the international community turning away from the issues and even criminal and illegal activity that has now festered into. The efforts were led by the United States, and the efforts in the Security Council appeared to care little about the illegal fishing and the root causes for fishermen taking up piracy in the first place (18).

While the UN SC Resolution of December 16 2008, which is just as equally bad as Resolution 1816, recognized “its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s rights with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries...the rest of the documents do not describe what should be done to address the root causes why Somalis are taking up piracy in the first place – so the efforts of the United Nations to address the root causes – and take steps to make the social economic conditions that lead Somalis into “raising the Jolly Roger” fail miserably and even short-change the Somali people themselves (19).

The path that the Security Council took since the “Somali pirate” issue became a frenzy and almost hysterical issue in the international community is one that wrongly militarizes the problem of piracy and only military solutions appear to be the only ones considered. This is not surprising, given that the chief architects of these resolutions were the United States. The two day, Security Council conference, in which celebrated the European Union’s Operation Atalanta start, saw the militaristic, resolutions “against piracy," crafted to accept everything from a “center to monitor piracy and armed robbery in the area,” to ground invasions of "pirate dens" as “an extension of the powers countries already have to enter Somali waters to chase pirates” (20).

For his part Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, spoke of the need to continue the peace process,” but did not speak of the issues of illegal fishing and loss of livelihood that has lead Somali fishermen into piracy. Ban Ki-moon did not speak of how to prevent illegal fishing, waste dumping, but only spoke of “bringing the pirates to justice.” The Security Council failed through its overly emotional resolutions to “bring pirates to justice” and “punish them” with NO regard for the destruction of the fishermens' livelihoods or lives though illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping (21). The second failure of the Security Council was to understand the human conditions that have lead fishermen to become pirates – and this could have tragic consequences for the future. There are reports that the UN does know about what toxic wastes have been dumped and who dumped them. The Somali fishermen have accused European countries of the practice of dumping nuclear waste, which a UN envoy states helps fuel the piracy, to that damages the waters with uranium radioactive waste, heavy metals like cadmium and mercury (22).

Yet, this also was the sentiments of Somalia’s envoy to the United Nations, in July 2008, that the problem of piracy started though illegal fishing and dumping. It is known that European ships have been illegally fishing and dumping for years off of Somalia's coast. Ould Abdallah further highlighted the almost endless civil war and anarchy in his country, and lack of effective government – criminality is rampant and corrupt ministers or warlords are paid for protection or to grant fake licenses. The envoy has asked several international organizations, including Global Witness, to investigate the disaster of Somalia’s coast. "It is a disaster off the Somali coast, a disaster the Somali environment, the Somali population” (23).

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How fishermen became pirates – illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping by European vessels.

The reality is the “Somali pirate” problem is a symptom – not the disease. This is a symptom that cannot be cured though military solutions to “Somali piracy,” as acknowledged by Somalia’s envoy Ould Abdallah and stability of the country, as reflected on by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is the real answer. It is not only wrong for the for the United Nations and the European Union to treat “Somali pirate” problem in a need of a military solution while ignoring the larger problem of illegal fishing – but irresponsible and injustice to the Somali people. “Piracy is a symptom of the power vacuum inside Somalia,” writes the Economist, and just as much of a problem as the thousands who are fleeing the fighting with Islamists in the country (24). Likewise, the Canadian Friends of Somalia “thinks that in the final analysis, it is illegal fishing that is to blame” as well as the dysfunctional government and the chaos in the country.

However, it should be pointed out that conducting anti-piracy patrols in these waters can only ever be half of the solution. The other is to protect Somali waters against illegal fishing, thus giving local fishermen a fair chance to earn a living without turning to criminality. With all the focus on piracy and the "lure of easy money", it is all but forgotten that the majority of Somali fishermen do just that - try to earn a decent living against all odds, and now more and more often in the crossfire of pirates and navies. A deadly catch indeed. (25)

This dumping and illegal fishing started after the failing of the Somali government in 1991. There is no responsible government in Somalia to respond to the trespass upon their fishing waters – and there are reports that radioactive hospital waste from Europe has been dumped in their waters. It is cheap to dump such waste, as it costs $2.50 a tonne, compared to $1000 a tonne in Europe. Firms for Switzerland and Italy, where many waste disposal companies are believed to be controlled by the Mafia, were once reported to have dumped wastes in Somalia’s waters, having paid off government leaders. The tsunami of 2004 washed up some of the hazardous wastes, uranium radioactive waste, lead, cadmium, mercury, industrial, hospital, chemical, leather treatment and other toxic waste, that revealed “frightening activity” of the scope of the toxic dumping. When the containers washed ashore, the hundreds of people became sick with symptoms of bleeding and skin infections (26).

The lack of protection for the Somali coast-line meant that the world freely exploited its tuna-rich waters. The fishermen have lost their way to feed their families are starving, according to Johann Hari:

In 1991, the government of Somalia - in the Horn of Africa - collapsed. Its nine million people have been teetering on starvation ever since - and many of the ugliest forces in the Western world have seen this as a great opportunity to steal the country's food supply and dump our nuclear waste in their seas (27).

According to Eaglespeak, a naval security blog, the Somalis asked the U.S. Navy to protect their fishing waters from those foreign fishing vessels that are taking advantage of the chaos in Somalia Government. Eaglespeak recommends that the waters off the Somali coast become under the protection of the United Nations and sanction that patrolling of the waters to protect Somali natural resources for the benefit of the Somali people. However, the United Nations and its bodies know about the plunder of Somali natural resources, but words have not been following by concrete deeds (28). The Somali government asked both for protection of food aid and merchant ships from pirates, but the government also asked for aid in curbing illegal fishermen:

The powerless Somali transitional government has asked the US Navy, which last month arrested pirates in the country's coastline, to extend its patrols in the Indian Ocean and curb illegal fishing along its vast coastline.

The request came nearly a month after the US Navy's Fifth Fleet arrested 10 pirates who had attempted to hijack a merchant ship in Somali waters.

"Somalia is grateful for recent initiative taken by the United States Navy aimed at curtailing rampant sea piracy that has been taking place in the territorial waters of Somalia," Fisheries and Marine Resources Minister Hassan Abshir Farah said ...

"But it will also be pleased if similar action could be taken against illegal fisheries in the Somali territorial waters. The illegal international fishing vessels cause serious damage to Somali marine resources and its environment” (29).

In absence of help from the UN or the U.S. Navy, the Somali fishermen took it upon themselves to protect their waters from illegal fishing. The “Somali piracy war” and the problem faced by the Somali fishermen is not only one of an incompetent government that cannot protect its own waters from poaching and polluting, but the illegally fishing vessels have been aggressive, as well as lawless. The “pirate” groups, according the Peter Lehr, see themselves as a volunteer force that is protecting their natural resources and fishing waters from poachers and looters that fly the flags of EU Member States, especially France and Spain. The groups that spring from self-help patrols call themselves National Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia and Somali Marines (30).

Somali fishermen complained that their nets and other fishing equipment were repeatedly destroyed. There were reports of small boats being crushed by larger vessels and nets and their catches being taken by the foreign fishermen. ‘We have been lucky that foreigners have not landed on our beaches to take over our villages and mud huts,’ observed Ally Bakari, a fisherman in Brava district, 210 kilometres south of Mogadishu (31).

The first thing that they are fishermen from impoverished villages that took up the piracy after being run out of their fishing waters by foreign vessels. In the chaos in Somalia, some foreign fishing vessels are using illegal nets and outlawed equipment. Local fishermen have had boiling water poured on them, their nets destroyed, and their boats rammed, resulting in the deaths of fishermen. The fishermen themselves brought weapons for self protection out to sea, but the outlaw fishing vessels begin acquiring high tech equipment to defeat the local fishermen (32).

The Somali fishermen simple did not wake up one morning and decide to hijack food aid ships and oil tankers, and hold them for ransom. The Somali fishermen were made into pirates by the chaos in the country and loss of their fishing livelihoods. All observers agree that the roots of the “Somali piracy” problem are rooted in illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping, compounded by the lack of an effective and credible government in Mogadishu. The problem is that the European Union and the United Nations deal with governments only, and it's known that often governments do not have the best interests of their own people in mind.

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The faulty Security Council resolutions and retooling Operation Atalanta mission.

The first thing we should note is that there is nothing that defends and celebrates European values and promotes them in Somalia, Kenya, the Gulf of Aden, or elsewhere related to the “Somali pirates” problem, especially in the Security Council mandates for Operation Atalanta. This is due to the Security Council resolutions themselves, 1816, 1851, having been crafted by the United States, especially the Bush administration. The American style, especially Bush neoconservative, is to treat international security problems as always in need of exclusively military solutions. We see here and the idea of a military –cowboy style “bring the pirates to justice” being expressed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1816 and 1851, with little in these ill conceived and poorly written resolutions that will bring about a more just and peace-building solution to the “Somali pirate” problem. From the standpoint of European values, these UN resolutions are all wrong to begin with.

There is no reason why the “mandate” of Operation Atalanta cannot also include protecting Somali waters from poachers and polluters. The only redeeming part of the poorly crafted UN Resolution 1851 is the small paragraph that: Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s rights with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law,” so the protection of Somalia’s natural resources is part of protecting its national “sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence” (33).

Since the language to legitimize the retooling of EU NAVFOR’s mission is already in place, it probably would require the Secretary-General/High Representative and Council approval to extend the mandate to Operation Atalanta into combating illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping. This could be done until the time that the Somali government can do it one its own. This practice should be considered in situations where poorly written Security Council mandates, such as 1851– and bring European values and identity to back to ESDP missions (34). According to Article 6 of the 19 September 2008, Council Decision:

Under the responsibility of the Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the EU military coordination action. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the EU Treaty. This authorisation shall include powers to amend the implementation plan. It shall also include the powers to take further decisions on the appointment of the Head of the EU Coordination Cell. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the EU military coordination action shall remain vested in the Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative (35).

This cowboy-style, “pirate hunt” on the part EU NAVFOR can be retooled to defend the natural resources of the Somalis, which includes defense of Somalia’s “sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence” – and right to its national resources – to be free from poacher and polluters. The Somali government could also ask the European Union and other navies to help curb the poaching and plotting of its waters, which would be the best way to get protection for Somalia’s natural resources, but chaos still reigns.

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The responsibility for the European Union in cleaning up the toxic mess and rebuilding Somali’s natural resources.

What European citizens should be concern about is the prospect that Operation Atalanta may actually be providing protection to those that want to freely poach, plunder and pollute Somali waters. The coast line has been undermined by toxic wastes that have been dumped and the constant fishing has depleted Somalia’s natural resources. The presence of Operation Atalanta is already deterring fishermen from protecting their fishing waters, unless they be branded “pirates” and sent to a prison in Kenya. Since the protective presence of Operation Atalanta may spawn an acceleration of the loss of Somali natural resources, the European Union and every Member State that takes part in the operation have a special responsibility to fix the damage once the nation is stable.

It is well known that governments do not always do what is best for their own people. The so-called Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia has welcomed the European and other foreign navies into its waters – to “catch pirates” – but not to curb illegal fishing, or investigate toxic waste dumping and curb the further dumping of wastes (36). The European Union and other members of the international community should pressure the TFG to either allow interdiction of poachers and polluters – or do so without the TFG’s “permission.”

Also – the European Union simply cannot depend or continue to wait on the Somali government to do the right thing and protect its natural resources, shorelines and the livelihoods of its fishermen. As reported by the naval security blog Eaglespeak and Al Jazeera, the United Nations knows of the extent of the illegal fishing and toxic waste problem and even who the outlaws are. Also, international law demands the protection of Somali’s natural resources and fishing waters for the benefit of the Somali people – and the EU’s naval force should protect Somali waters until there is an effective and interested government in Somalia. When the security situation improves in Somalia, the European Union should take the responsibility to investigate the toxic waste dumping and be prepared to take action against any violators, including European citizens. Basic justice demands no less!

For the past several years, the European Union has been trying to carve out a European-level criminal justice space. It has been trying to criminalize the dumping of wastes in European waters and such criminal law is part of the Lisbon Treaty. So, it is fine to dump toxic wastes in the Somalis’ waters, but criminal to do it in your own?

This is an instance of the European Union taking to the letter Security Council resolutions, mainly 1816 and 1851 that are ill-conceived, poorly written, and written with pure emotion, without regard for why fishermen become pirates in the first place. Given that these Security Council resolutions were authored by the Americans, especially the Bush administration, it is not surprising they promote a military only solution to the "Somali pirate problem." The European Union, Javier Solana, the PSC and the rest of the Council apparatus must wake to the fact that the Security Council does not embody European values and is made up of nations that, especially the Permanent Five, especially the Americans, hold positions and views that are contrary to European values. With that, some kind of supplemental mandate was in order for Operation Atalanta. The Union has had a recent tendency to unquestioningly act as a military arm for the Security Council, for good or bad, right or wrong, and this is one of those bad and wrong instances.

MEP Ana Gomes is very correct in her assessments of Operation Atalanta. The chaos of the country must be remembered and piracy is not the disease, but the symptom of sickness of Somalia, the "utterly failed nation." "Bringing pirates to justice" without consideration of why fishermen turn to pirates and with no meaningful solutions to counter why fishermen become pirates is simply contrary to European values, even if it comes from the Security Council. What also will make Operation Atalanta a failure is if it also provides protection for those that want to poach and pollute Somali waters under the protection of the EU naval group, EU NAVFOR.

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Notes

1. Council of the European Union. “EU naval operation against piracy.” March 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090313FactsheetEU-NAVFORSomalia-v3_EN.pdf [accessed on March 14, 2009].

2. The author is in the process of working on her Master’s thesis on European identity and its role in European foreign and security policy. One question is: What are the shared principles and values that should guide the European Union’s foreign and security policy? One of those values involves the use of holistic, non-military means to solve real human problems, such as why fishermen become pirates. Operation Atalanta, with its military only focus, defies European values, and their should be some efforts, such as protecting Somali waters from illegal fishing to make the operation truly European.

3. John McCormick. The European Superpower. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 162-69.

4. Jeremy Rifkin. The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream. (New York: Pengiun Group, 2004), 308, 309.

5. Mark Leonard. Why Europe will Run the 21st Century. (London, UK: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2005), 64-5.

6. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 208-09; Council of the European Union. “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.” 12 December 2003. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [accessed on 13 March 2003].

7. Council of the European Union. 12 December 2003.

8. Bretherton and Vogler, 209; Ademola Abass. “Extraterritorial Collective Security: The European Union and Operation Artemis,” in European Security Law, Martin Trybus and Nigel D. White (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 153, 155.

9. Frederik Naert. “ESDP in Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious Operations,” in European Security Law, Martin Trybus and Nigel D. White (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 64; See Appendix (Nice Treaty, Art. 25).

10. Frederik Naert , 64.

11. Abass, 154.

12. Council of the European Union. “Presidency Report on ESDP.” 9 December 2008, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/st16686.en08.pdf [accessed on 12 March 2009].

13. Ibid.

14. Council of the European Union. Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP. 8 December 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:330:0019:0020:EN:PDF [accessed 14 March 2008].

15. European Parliament. “MEPs: Gunboats not enough to root out Somali piracy.” 15 December 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ [accessed on 13 March 2009]; The Courier. “The European Union is concerned by the political situation in Somalia.” 17 December 2008, http://www.acp-eucourier.info. [accessed on 12 March 2009]; European Parliament. “Parliament adopts resolution on maritime piracy - legally incontrovertible rules of engagement needed.” 23 October 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu [accessed on 13 March 2009]. In this article, MEPs are actually taking about EU NAVCO defending fishing vessels, which are probably poaching in Somali waters!

16. The Courier. “The European Union is concerned by the political situation in Somalia.” 17 December 2008, http://www.acp-eucourier.info/. [accessed on 12 March 2009]; European Parliament, 23 October 2008.

17. Peter Lehr. “A western armada is not the way to sink Somalia's pirates.” 19 November 2008. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/19/piracy-somalia [accessed 11 March 2009]. Johann Hari. "You are being lied to about pirates." London Independent. 4 January 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you-are-being-lied-to-abo_b_155147.html [accessed on 10 March 2009].

18. People’s Daily Online. “UN Security Council adopts resolution on fighting Somalia piracy.” 17 December 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/6555093.html [accessed on 12 March 2009]; DefenseWeb. “UN Security Council authorises raids on pirate dens.” 18 December 2008, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=898&Itemid=366 [accessed on 15 March 2009].

19. UN Security Council. S/RES/1851, 16 December 2008. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/N0865501.pdf [accessed on 13 March 2009]; The Economist. "The world's most utterly failed state." 2 October 2008. http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12342212 [accessed on 13 March 2009]; Johann Hari, 4 January 2009.

20. People’s Daily Online. “UN Security Council adopts resolution on fighting Somalia piracy.” 17 December 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/6555093.html [accessed on 12 March 2009]; British Broadcasting Company. “UN approves piracy land pursuit.” 17 December 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7786652.stm [accessed on 14 March 2009].

21. UN Security Council, 16 December 2008; UN News Center. "Somalia: UN-backed meeting wraps up with call for greater action to fight piracy." 11 December 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29268&Cr=somali&Cr1=&Kw1=Somalia&Kw2=piracy&Kw3= [accessed on 12 March 2009].

22. Al Jazeera. 'Toxic waste' behind Somali piracy.” 11 October 2008, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218644 [accessed on 11 March 2009]; Mohamed Abshir Waldo. “Somalia Piracy: The Two Faces. The shipping piracy & the invasion of the Somali seas.” The African Executive. 4 Feburary 2009, http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=4060 [accessed on 11 March 2009]; Johann Hari, 4 January 2009.

23. AFP. “UN envoy decries illegal fishing, waste dumping off Somalia” 25 July 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gVV_gQDsp1m8v7nPcumVc5McYV-Q [accessed on 14 March 2009]; Johann Hari, 4 January 2009.

24. The Economist. The world's most utterly failed state. October 1 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12342212

25. Peter Lehr, 19 November 2008; Mohamed Abshir Waldo, 4 Feburary 2009; Johann Hari , 4 January 2009.

26. Al Jazeera, 11 October 2008; Mohamed Abshir Waldo, 4 Feburary 2009.

27. Johann Hari, 4 January 2009.

28. Eaglespeak. “Protecting Somalia's Fishing Grounds.” 29 November 2007, http://www.eaglespeak.us/2007/11/protecting-somalias-fishing-grounds.html [accessed on 14 March 2009]. Also see United Nations Laws of the Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm

29. Eaglespeak. “US Navy asked to act as Somali ‘fishery patrol.’ " 19 February 2006, http://www.eaglespeak.us/2006/02/us-navy-asked-to-act-as-so_114036718633338255.html [accessed on 14 March 2009];

30. Peter Lehr, 19 November 2008; People’s Daily Online. “Somalia urges U.S. navy to deal with illegal fishing, piracy.” 21 February 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200602/21/eng20060221_244324.html [accessed on 14 March 2009].

31. Somaliuk. “How illegal fishing feeds Somali piracy.” 15 November 2005, http://www.somaliuk.com/Indepth1/Fullarticle.php?IndepthID=378 [accessed on 15 March 2009]

32. Mohamed Abshir Waldo, 04 February 2009; Somaliuk, 15 November 2005.

33. UN Resolution 1851, 16 December 2008.

34. Council of the European Union. “ESDP structures and instruments” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=EN [accessed on 14 March 2009]

35. Official Journal of the European Union. “Council Joint Action. 2008/749/CFSP of 19 September 2008 on the European Union military coordination action in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO).” L 252/39. 20 September 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:252:0039:0042:EN:PDF [accessed on 14 March 2009].

36. Sana Aftab Khan. "Tackling Piracy in Somali Waters: Rising attacks impede delivery of humanitarian assistance." UN News Center. http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/073107_somalia.htm [accessed on 15 March 2009].

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Selected Bibliography

Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor. (New York: Routledge, 2006).

McCormick, John . The European Superpower. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

Rifkin, Jeremy. The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream. (New York: Pengiun Group, 2004), 308, 309.

Trybus, Martin and Nigel D. White, eds. European Security Law. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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Appendix

Article 25 – Nice Treaty - http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf

Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Within the scope of this Title, this Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations.

The Council may authorise the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation, without prejudice to Article 47.