The Development of the European Community and Union
ESLaPorte - July 22, 2009
Post World War Two
In the interim years between the world wars the seed of European cooperation and integration were planted by French statesman, Aristide Briand. In 1930, Briand proposed a "moral union of Europe" which envisioned economic and political union. Briand was especially interested in Franco-German reconciliation. Of the 27 European members of the League of Nations, only the Netherlands responded to Briand's Assembly speech to the call to a European union of security. The year of 1931 saw both the death of Briand and his ideas. As his ideas were under discussion, the Nazis were enjoying their first election successes and Mussolini proposed a "European security" pact between Italy, Germany, Britain and France (Davies 1998, 950-951).
Winston Churchill was the first leader of the post-World War Two European world to offer an end to the centuries of power politics and warfare. Under generous support from the United States, which supported European integration, the European movement found new ground (Dinan 1999, 13; Davies 1998, 1065). According to Jeremy Rifkin (2004) what Churchill pondered that:
After a thousand years of unremitting conflict, war, and bloodshed, the nations of Europe emerged from the shadows of two world wars, in the span of less than half of century, decimated: their population maimed and killed, their ancient monuments and infrastructure lying in ruins, their worldly treasures depleted, their way of life destroyed. Determined that they would never again take up arms against one another, the nations of Europe searched for a political mechanism that could bring them together and move them beyond their ancient rivalries (200).
Churchill's commitment to permanent peace in Europe made him the choice to chair the Congress of Europe in 1948 in The Hague, attended by 800 eminent people, including Jean Monnet, who commented that "Europe never existed&ldots;one genuinely has to create Europe" (Davies 1998, 1066; Rifkin 2004, 200). According to Rifkin, Monnet was the one who led the way toward the creation of a common European community among Europeans who were former enemies (201). Monnet sent his proposal to Robert Schuman, but the proposal for a common coal and steel community caught friction in the post war atmosphere in France of retribution against Germany. Schuman, who embraced reconciliation through Franco-German economic integration contacted German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, another European leader that enthusiastically embraced European reconciliation through economic integration. Secretary of State Dean Acheson encouraged Adenauer to assume leadership in Europe on "these problems" (Dinan 1999, 21, 22).
Schuman delivered his proposal to the French Assembly on May 9, 1950 which called on the creation of a High Authority that would become the supranational institution of shared national sovereignty in the coal and steel sector and would supervise the formulation of the common market and competition. This arrangement would be open to participation by other countries in Europe (Dinan 1999, 25). In between the lines of the Schuman Declaration are statements of community and the desire that "this production will be offered to the whole world without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peacefully achievements." The first step "to making any war between France and Germany unthinkable," is viewed as "leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions" (Schuman 1998, 14).
One modern, European leader reflected that the European Union is based on Europe's rejection of power politics and the abandonment of hegemonic ambitions of individual states. Others share Joschka Fisher's view in giving the European Union credit in ending the historical antagonisms between France and Germany and in promoting new forms of international cooperation and helping to end warfare in Europe. (Linklater 2005 368-69). The intentions of the Treaty of Rome were security through the creation of a community, the "foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe" that was at first based on economic integration. "Strengthen their economies" and to "strengthen peace and liberty" were about security through economic integration (Treaty of Rome ).
Pierre-Henri Laurent (1972) tells us that the "community spirit" was one of the drivers behind the Rome Treaty and the desires of its national representatives to succeed in the creation of the common market community (217-218). Although the negotiations were intense and detailed, the views of the Six converged, but, at the time, Yalem (1952) had his doubts the "transfer of loyalty" to the Community, especially with regard to integrating Germany, and gaining public support. The "experiments," according to Yalem, were intended to expand "Little Europe" into political integration (62-64). While the Treaty of Rome was about economic integration and the Common Market, Yalem argued, in 1952, that something deeper was needed for "Little Europe."
The problem of achieving European economic integration cannot be separated from the problem of attaining European political integration as well. The relationship is reciprocal in the sense that the success of the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, and the European Economic Community depends to a large degree on the extent to which the countries represented maintain political cohesion and solidarity in the years ahead. Conversely, these experiments in international co-operation reflect a growing sense of community of interests among the six nations concerned without which political unification would be impossible (55).
Coal, Steel, and Reconciliation
Konrad Adenauer, one of the leading advocates of the European Community, wrote that (at the time) what happens in Germany is significant for the whole world. The German leader wrote that Western culture is based upon the democratic practices of liberty and the rule of law in society. The German people, argues Adenauer, failed to obtain the liberal democracy that the idealized in the late 1800s, and so, fell victim to the nationalism of the National Socialist party in the distress, but Germans thought that their democracy was safe. The result was a destructive war on Germany that have left millions dead and homeless or as refugees, physically unable to work or unemployed, and no housing or social-economic security - and there are mounting pressures from the East. Adenauer vows that such a situation must not happen again (1952, 156-158).
After the smashing of the totalitarian idols and after the sufferings of the war, the German people were left standing on the edge of an abyss. The catastrophe made the German people realize that in the past, peace had again and again been wrecked on the rocks of an exaggerated nationalism. This led to recognition that our existence, as well as that of all the other European nations, could be preserved only within a community transcending national frontiers.
Inspired by this conception, the Federal Republic has co-operated most readily in the preparation of two treaties...I am referring to the treaty on the European coal and steel community and to the treaty on the European defense community (158).
The ideas of French Minister, Aristide Briand, according to Alphand, Hervé (1952) would be the French Government's new efforts, the coal and steel community, but would also mean the transfer of some state sovereignty to a supranational high authority, which was not a part of Briand's original idea that would retain full sovereignty and have veto power in institutions over decisions that were to be made through unanimity. Hervé gives us three "guiding ideas" for the plan for supranational institutional care of their coal and steel production: decisions of the high authority are enforceable on all member states, create a free market free of quotas and tariffs, and prohibit cartels and price fixing (142).
While Adenauer's wish for the coal and steel community would turn out well, his desire for the European defense community (EDC) treaty, the Pleven Plan, would be killed in the French National Assembly in August 1954. Arnold Kanter (1970) attributes the defeat of the EDC treaty to the chaos of fourth Republic politics, but also the position of the French military and the perceived undermining of French national army. The proposal would have brought the rearming of Germany, strongly desired by the U.S. to hedge the Soviet threat, though a European Army. The EDC treaty was modeled after the Coal and Steel Community, in that defense would be a part of a shared institution. Beyond the very touchy idea of rearming Germany, writes Kanter, was the disappearance of the French National Army to a European Army. The "Europeans" in the National Assembly argued that the EDC would be a "magical vehicle" for Franco-German reconciliation. The EDC was viewed as giving the rearming Germany was not needed and dangerous, as it could leave France as a subordante member of the defense community. Eventually, West Germany would be rearmed through NATO and become an Alliance member and firmly anchored to European defense against the Soviet threat (201, 205, 206; Thomas 1997, 38, 43-44).
Ian Q. R. Thomas (1997) argues that the concept of détente, the French word for relaxation, was not clear, but what was clear was the leaders of both sides of the Cold War traded belligerent hyperbole for cooperative ventures, such as trade and arms control, but was also linked to Soviet behavior. The West German Ostpolitik policies were a part of the détente period which became a "cooperative coexistance" policy in NATO (88). Christoph Bertram, writing in 1979, stated that Ostpolitik for West Germany was not just to "lessen tensions," but to work on what was feasible in East-West relations, despite ideological and power differences, to maintain stability in Europe (108). Laszlo Gorgey (1968) argues that the West German hope in Ostpolitik and active participation in the West's détente policies was a safety measure toward maintaince of peace and order in Europe. Part of the hope coming out of Bonn was that the Ostpolitik policies would reduce psychological barriers to a political solution toward Eastern Europe. In 1965, Germans supported the idea of Ostpolitik - even as the West German government, according to Gorgey, did not have so clear policies, and began placing more stock in European unification than German reunification (695-696, 681). Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1970) described the 1969 election programs on foreign policy by political parties reflected a desire for "human, cultural, economic and political relations with the Soviet Union, East Europe and Southeastern Europe and for the "maintaince of peace" and a "peace settlement" as parts of West German foreign policy (610-611).
The "habit" of cooperation and CSFP creation
The forerunner to the common foreign and security policy (CSFP) was the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The informal institution existed from 1970 to the Maastricht Treaty of November 1994 and was founded upon the Luxembourg Report. There is no single "master variable" to explain the emergence of CSFP, as the EPC emerged outside of the treaty process according to the unpredictable intermingling of actors and institutions through a historical process and informal cooperation between Member States. The EPC "habit" got its start from the Luxembourg Report, or the Davignon Report, a report that was a statement of the desire to further European integration through enlargement and that the Common Market was nearing its final stage and "reaching a turning point in history." The next step was for Member States to step up their political integration "so as to bring nearer the day when Europe can speak with one voice." Also part of this expression was the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission" (Jørgensen 2002, 212-213, Luxembourg Report 1970, Salmon 2003, 468).
Trevor Salmon (2003) gives a good evolutionary account of the European Political Cooperation and the "habit" of the "working together" of Member States to coordinate their common political actions and required consensus for action. The EPC fostered the "habit" of cooperation between Member states that wanted to deepen their integration and aspired to common foreign and security policies, even Union. Salmon argues that the Communtiy was not to be understood through the formal and legalistic study of the Treaties, but a wider political environement which to achieve a union, which foreign and security policies would be a part of intergration. There was a feeling that EPC reached a "plateau" and the need for inclusion in the Single European Act, or SEA. Prior to the events in Yugoslavia, the Community was viewed as a force in international relations (3, 2). The importance of the developments of the early 1970's in European common foreign and security "habit" have been stressed by Stephaine Anderson (2008) in that the efforts were more about building nations more than security. Anderson argues that foreign policy was the best way for the heads of Member States to achieve progress in unification in the context of enlargement with the goal of "maintaining peace." The people of Europe were coming to understand, at this time, that "they embody certain values which have had an inestimable influence on the development of civilization. Why should we cease to spread our ideas abroad when we have always done so?" (123, 125).
The EPC was described by Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (1984) as a "protosystem" for a lasting effort with eventual guidelines and procedures and the desire on the part of the Community to make the loose, informal activities more grounded in something formal (468). In the backdrop of the December 1973 Copenhagen conference was European activities in the Middle East and the desire to "keep the momentum towards greater unity in foreign policy" and with economic interests of the Member States. There was a feeling expressed that the "cease fire and the efforts towards opening negotiations were prepared and effected with no participation by Europe in any form whatsoever." This situation was regarded as a "dangerous way of doing things. The European Parliament passed a resolution that was "considering that the political identity of Community Europe should enable Europe fulfill its world responsibilities and will facilitate more effective dialogue and cooperation with Europe s world partners and particularly with the United States of America" (European Community 1973, 25, 28). The feeling of helplessness and a "weak voice" in the bipolar system of the day was discussed by Evan Luard (1986) and this weakness included with its principle ally, the United States, and that a political, diplomatic dimension would make Europe a better "partner" to the U.S. (574).
Roger Rieber (1976) argues that the external policies of the Community are the most difficult in the attempt to achieve common positions on issues, such as the Middle East. First through integration, and, second, an agreement on economic internal policies permits agreement on external policy positions. These policies lead to the institutionalization of economic policies of third states that allows for common positions between the Community and the third state. The third would be reaction by the Community to crisis and situations that go beyond the limits of policy formation. The decisions in policy areas have taken place at "summits" by heads of states or governments and regular meetings, but the success or failure will be the ability of the Community to fashion a new form of sovereignty that does not threaten the independence and identity of its Member States, or their vital interests (224-226).
Major themes of the conference were energy and oil security, economic security and that the increase of international tensions and their repercussions which should be a "union," while at the same time expressing numerous desires to play "our appointed role in the international community" (European Community 1973, 25, 8). The Copenhagen Conference made a bold statement on European identity, the Document on the European Identity, was issued from Copenhagen in December 1973 by the Nine. The stated purposes of this declaration were in light of the dynamics of the relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs" (48). The defining of European identity involves, according to the Document, 1.) reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations; 2.) access the extent the member nations are acting together in relation to the rest of the world; 3). the dynamics of European unification. The Nine want their values and the diversity of their national cultures respected (European Communities 14 December 1973).
Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice which is the ultimate goal of economic progress- and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity (49).
The Single European Act brought the "habit" of the EPC into a stronger form through the creation of a secretariat and greater articulation of policy aims, the need to complete the common market and the creation of a European Pillar inside of NATO (McSweeney 1988, 205). Knud Erik Jørgensen (2002) writes that the EPC's institutionization was mainly in the area of norms and rules, "soft law," ever closer consultation and coordination. Norms were established for the Member State holding the presidency and the desirability for European solidarity when it was possible. Ways of thinking about foreign policy shifted from the individual state to the collective identity, from the "I" mode to the "we" mode. Jørgensen cautions that the development of norms did not lead to a common European policy and it would be two decades before it challenged national foreign policy practices and establishments (213). Roy Ginsberg (2001) argues that European foreign policy is also shaped by the context of European experiences, identity, values and the practice of EFP helps foster a shared identity. "The EPC (CSFP) stimulates a consciousness of and a debate about what Europe ought to be doing...and European diplomacy has become associated with in the public mind with a set of principles." "Those principles," writes Ginsberg, "are democracy, soft-edged capitalism, a zone of peace among members, and diplomatic mediation between third parties ...to the causes of major conflict" (25).
The end of the Cold War was a springboard for the development of the European Community into the European Union. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union (TEU), changed EPC to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and placed the Pillar II policy area of the three pillar structure of the Treaty. CSFP was grounded into EU structures in the form of Directorate-General E of the Council Secretariat. The new European Union's Council could take "common positions" of more formal statements than from the EPC based on EU aims and "joint actions," such as such as sending election observers or peace envoys. (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 4-5; Smith 2004, 10-11).
Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world (TEU)
The TEU also saw the creation of an ambitious European Security and Defense Identity without resources or capabilities to back up rhetoric, according to William Wallace (2005 438). John McCormick ( ) argues that the EU's weak frameworks in CSFP and ESDI became noticeable in the Balkans produced a divided and weak response at a time when the Community clearly needed to produce a meaningful response. After the Yugoslav Army invaded Slovenia in January 1991, the Community was again divided and could not produce a military response to the crisis (53). The Community got off to a good start with a conference, but this effort fell apart after the Community choose to recognize Croatia and Slovenia and the Community's role as a neutral arbiter lost credibility. It would be the United States, largely though NATO, that would bring peace to the Balkans (Wallace 2005, 438; Ginsberg 2001, 57-59; Pond 2006, 9-38). The 1999, NATO led action to stop Milosevic's brutal actions against the Albanian population in Kosovo was, according to John McCormick, a statement that served to push the EU into building military capabilities (53).
The disappointments would lead to the creation in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam of the High Representative for CSFP who would be charged with oversight of this policy area. According to Roy Ginsberg, a whole new array of civilian activities were added to CSFP in trade, aid and diplomacy, which included a policy planning and crisis early warning unit (2001, 3). The institutional structure of the CSFP would be further strengthened in the 2003 Treaty of Nice, ESDI would become ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy), and would include military and policing instruments in security and defense policy. The position of High Representative would be filled by former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, and he would make very important contributions in the EU's ability to be an effective foreign and security actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 5).
Solana's main contribution to common foreign and security policy would be European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003, which also bore the title "A Secure Europe in a Better World." Jolyon Howorth (2005) called this "Solana paper" an "attempt to think through the real political objectives of ESDP (195). The ESS lays out the main threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, but defines the root causes as poverty and global suffering. The "strategic objectives" of the document are the building of security in the European region and creating a viable new international order. The ESS is strong in upholding international law and recognizing the United Nations as the chief source of international legitimacy and order (Howorth 2005, 195).
Around the time of the crafting of the ESS, the EU launched its first military operation, Operation Concordia, taking over a NATO mission to police the peace between ethnic Albanian rebels and the Macedonian government. In June 2003, the EU launched its first military mission outside of Europe with Operation Artemis, sending 1,800 troops to the democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the request of the United Nations Security Council. The Artemis mission was viewed as the European Union's first armed intervention into a conflict in the DRC that did not directly concern a Member State (McCormick 75-76; Abass 2007 135,
The ESS's first line: "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has give away to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history." (ESS 2003, 1). Besides the United States and NATO being given credit for their critical role in European security, successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent. Karen Smith (2004) argues that the prospect of membership for European third countries has become a powerful policy instrument, provided for in Article 237 of the Rome Treaty and replaced by Article O of Maastricht Treaty, and accession treaties must be ratified by all Member States and the assessing state (7).
Boyka Stefanova's 2005 case study concludes that EU enlargement has become an important internal security that contains the elements of accession of Central and Eastern countries, geographical expansion and eventual expansion to the Balkans nations. The CSFP is, argues Stefanova, the EU's "external anchor," with enlargement as the "most important security-producing process taking place inside of Europe today" (51-52).
Smith informs us that after the events of November 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, there was no question about including East Germany into the Community, although some Member States were hesitant. East Germany was regarded as a "special case" and swept into the Community in a unified Germany. The East Germany's "special case" and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe brought former Soviet bloc countries knocking at the door for membership. The Community promised that they could eventually become members and the short-term solution was to give out association agreements (85, 83). Smith also informs us of the nature of these association agreements that lead to membership accession treaties that begin with "closer and more substantial relations" and a "major aim" of the policy is to "support and encouragement...of free, open and democratic societies in which the full enjoyment of human rights is guanteed the by rule of law" (92).
The second generation of association agreements, taylored to each country, and were more political in that the country would be given access to the free trade area, financial aid, but would have to show commitment to the five conditions: rule of law, human rights, a multi-party system, free and fair elections and a market economy. These agreements provide a framework to intergrate associate countries into the Community, European Union, bring the countries' legislation progressively to the acquis communautaire, or the body of EU Treaties, laws and regulations (Smith 2004, 92-93, 99, 102). According to Nadezhda Arbatova (2006) there are three types of association agreements that apply to Eastern Europe. First, association agreements are set to a time frame that brings about a reduction in customs, duties and convergence of policies for EU membership accession. The European Agreements for central and East European states, the European-Meditrerranean Agreements - and the Stabalization and Association Agreements (SAAs), which are aimed at the Balkans states, including Serbia (46, 45).
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